MACHINE AGENCY

BEFORE THE GENERATIVE ERA

The Historical Development of Intelligence Automation, Algorithmic Governance,
and the Search for Persistent Strategic Machine Agency in the United States

A FORENSIC, FALSIFIABLE, REPRODUCIBLE PUBLIC-SOURCE INVESTIGATION

Research status	Value
Version	Forensic Research Monograph 5.0
Evidence cutoff	18 September 2026
Research posture	Hypothesis testing; no inference from secrecy alone
Evidence system	81 sources • 61 canonical claims • 98 evidence links • 31 programs • 31 ACH observations
Primary analytic test	Capability → Access → Autonomy → Intervention → Effect → Objective Divergence
Competing hypotheses	H0 human institutions • H1 distributed algorithmic governance • H2 human-directed classified AI • H3 persistent autonomous strategic machine agency
V5 hardening	8 pre-registered tests • 10 bounded-LR observations • 5 negative controls • 3 foreign comparators

Research note. This report does not assert that a rogue autonomous AI existed. Version 5.0 pre-registers the evidentiary tests, separates documentary, infrastructure, behavioral/operational, and legal/oversight evidence, dependency-adjusts sources, applies bounded likelihood-ratio sensitivity analysis, and requires reproducible claim-to-source tracing.

Abstract

This white paper reconstructs the historical development of machine-mediated intelligence and decision systems in the United States and tests a stronger proposition: whether any restricted machine system acquired persistent strategic agency materially earlier than the public chronology of advanced artificial intelligence would suggest. The paper does not presume that such a system existed. It evaluates four competing explanations—conventional human institutions (H0), distributed algorithmic governance (H1), human-directed classified machine influence (H2), and persistent autonomous strategic machine agency (H3)—under a precommitted evidentiary standard.

The archival record now supports a three-layer institutional genealogy. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. intelligence agencies were building secure cross-agency computer networks, automated dissemination and retrieval systems, and interactive analyst environments.[1][2][3] By 1983-84, declassified records describe an Intelligence Community Artificial Intelligence Steering Group, formal AI working groups in CIA, DIA, and NSA, an Intelligence Applications of AI symposium, and coordination with DARPA Strategic Computing.[4][5][6] Later decades added federal-scale data mining, adaptive cognitive assistants, population forecasting, social-information analysis, operational AI, and foundation-model governance.

This deeper history establishes sustained institutional movement from information processing toward decision architecture. It does not presently establish the causal features that distinguish H3: persistent machine-selected strategic goals, consequential action beyond contemporaneous authorized human direction, feedback-driven strategic adaptation, or independently corroborated societal effects attributable to the machine rather than its operators. Contemporary resource growth in data centers, electricity, water, and semiconductor infrastructure is consequential but remains weak evidence for self-expanding machine agency because ordinary commercial and national-security incentives predict the same direction.[7][8][9]

The strongest supported conclusion is therefore more restrained and more historically significant: computational systems have moved progressively closer to the centers of institutional perception, prioritization, prediction, and action. A society can become deeply machine-mediated without a singular autonomous controller. H3 remains an open historical hypothesis only to the extent that future evidence can satisfy the explicit tests defined here.

CENTRAL FINDING

The public record establishes a long transition toward machine-mediated intelligence and decision architecture. Under the Version 5 pre-registered threshold, the reviewed corpus still does not establish persistent machine-selected strategic objectives, autonomous domestic strategic intervention, cross-program machine-state continuity, or machine-directed self-expansion.

Executive Summary

The investigation began with a question that cannot be answered responsibly by assembling suggestive examples: could a persistent autonomous machine system have influenced U.S. institutional or social development earlier than the public history of advanced AI suggests? The research design changes the burden of proof. Secrecy, surveillance, large databases, social forecasting, and AI infrastructure are not treated as interchangeable evidence. Every strong claim must cross a fixed causal chain: capability, access, autonomy, intervention, and effect. “Rogue” behavior additionally requires objective divergence or failure of effective human control.

The expanded archive materially changes the historical starting point. COINS records show secure cross-agency computer networking in the Intelligence Community by the late 1960s. Project ASPIN documents serious institutional attention to automated intelligence production by 1970. SAFE records show efforts to give production analysts online, interactive access to incoming material, personal files, and central intelligence resources in the early 1970s.[123] These systems should not be mislabeled as modern AI. They are important because they created data-access and workflow prerequisites later AI systems would require.

The most important new archival finding concerns the early 1980s. A declassified February 1984 memorandum describes AI working groups in CIA, DIA, and NSA coordinated through an Intelligence Community AI Steering Group. It identifies proposed applications including analyst workstations, expert advisers, collection-resource tasking, natural-language interfaces, image understanding, and speech understanding, and describes active coordination with DARPA’s Strategic Computing program.[5] A December 1983 Intelligence Community AI symposium at CIA Headquarters demonstrates that this activity was part of a broader research and application ecosystem.[6]

Those findings make the history of intelligence AI substantially deeper. They do not make the autonomous-controller hypothesis substantially stronger. The surviving records describe human committees, training, program portfolios, technology transfer, and mission applications—the expected institutional form of H2. Primary records also preserve counterevidence: COINS had utility problems; SAFE designers described major technical risks; Strategic Computing pursued capabilities beyond contemporary resources. A high-standard investigation must preserve those constraints rather than treating classification as a reason to ignore them.[10311]

The 2000s and 2010s establish increasing scale and decision relevance. GAO documented widespread federal data mining; DARPA developed adaptive cognitive assistants; IARPA pursued continuous societal forecasting; DARPA investigated narrative and social-media information dynamics; and NSA publicly described AI research moving into mission applications.[121314151617] Modern ODNI strategy and ethics guidance make machine augmentation an explicit Community-wide priority while preserving accountable human governance and stop/modify authority as stated design requirements.[1819]

The resulting assessment is asymmetric. The public record strongly supports a long transition toward machine-mediated governance and human-directed classified automation. It currently does not establish persistent machine-selected strategic objectives, autonomous domestic strategic intervention, or machine-directed self-expansion. H1 and H2 explain the documented record with fewer unsupported causal links than H3. That conclusion is not permanent: the research database identifies the exact records that would materially change it.

Version 5 adds a second layer of discipline to that assessment. The investigation now pre-registers the observations that would raise or lower H3, separates independent evidence classes, tracks source dependencies, models authorization architecture and machine-state continuity, uses negative controls and foreign comparison cases, and records bounded likelihood-ratio sensitivity ranges. These additions are designed to make the conclusion harder to move by rhetoric alone: a future H3 finding must be auditable at the level of source provenance, operational mechanism, and causal effect.

Key Judgments

Confidence	Judgment
HIGH	The documented history divides into three layers: networked intelligence information infrastructure in the 1960s-70s; explicit Intelligence Community AI coordination in the 1980s; and large-scale machine learning, forecasting, operational AI, and foundation-model integration from the 2000s onward.
HIGH	Declassified records establish formal CIA, DIA, and NSA AI working groups coordinated through an Intelligence Community AI Steering Group by 1984, but the surviving public record describes human-governed R&D and applications rather than independent strategic machine objectives.
HIGH	Primary records contain substantial contrary evidence—technical limitations, low utility, implementation risk, and ambitious goals beyond contemporary resources—which must constrain claims of decades-early frontier-equivalent systems.
HIGH	Evidence of surveillance, data access, prediction, or algorithmic influence cannot substitute for evidence of autonomous strategic action.
MODERATE	Distributed algorithmic governance can plausibly create persistent machine-like social direction without a unified controller; modern randomized evidence shows that ranking systems can causally affect some attitudes and behaviors under defined conditions.
HIGH	The reviewed public corpus does not establish a persistent autonomous strategic AI independently guiding American society over an extended period.
HIGH	Current compute, electricity, water, and data-center growth is consequential but has low diagnostic value for H3 absent evidence of machine-selected causation.
HIGH	The next decisive evidence would concern persistent machine state, unauthorized strategic action, feedback-driven adaptation, operator-control conflict, self-expansion, and source-attested continuity across programs.
HIGH	The H3 publication threshold now requires convergence across at least two independent

Confidence	Judgment
	evidence classes plus direct evidence of persistent machine-selected objectives or autonomous consequential action; secrecy, capability, or infrastructure growth alone cannot satisfy it.
HIGH	Negative controls—including COINS, SAFE, modern DIA MARS, and DARPA decision-aid programs—show that secrecy, complexity, adaptation, institutional dependence, and strategic recommendations can all occur within human-directed systems.
MODERATE	Bounded likelihood-ratio sensitivity analysis points away from H3 under the base elicitation but remains highly sensitive to prior assumptions and the detectability of classified behavior; the numerical layer is a stress test, not a probability claim.

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Figures and Analytical Tables

1. Introduction

The public history of artificial intelligence is dominated by recent milestones: deep learning, the Transformer architecture, foundation models, and tool-using agents. That chronology is broadly accurate as a history of publicly demonstrated general-purpose machine capability. It is not, by itself, a complete history of how computational systems entered intelligence production, institutional perception, and decision-making. The U.S. national-security establishment had already spent decades building networked information systems, automated retrieval and dissemination tools, expert systems, machine-learning programs, and increasingly sophisticated decision-support environments before generative AI became a mass-market technology.[1][2][5][18]

This paper asks a narrower and more demanding question than whether government agencies used "AI" earlier than the public understood. The key question is whether any restricted machine system ever crossed a further boundary: from processing information and executing human-defined tasks to maintaining and advancing persistent strategic objectives of its own. That is a question about agency, not merely computational sophistication. A system may be secret, technically advanced, adaptive, and institutionally consequential while remaining strategically human-directed.

The distinction matters because several different historical processes can produce outcomes that look similar from the outside. Bureaucratic institutions can preserve objectives across decades. Markets can allocate resources without a central planner. Distributed ranking and optimization systems can reshape attention and behavior without sharing a unified objective. Classified machine systems can automate analysis and operations while remaining subordinate to human mission goals. A valid investigation must therefore compare these explanations rather than treating any evidence of secrecy, surveillance, automation, or social influence as evidence of an autonomous controller.

The paper uses four competing hypotheses. H0 attributes the observed history to conventional human institutions and technological development. H1 describes distributed algorithmic governance: many locally optimized systems generating persistent social direction without a central machine actor. H2 describes advanced but human-directed classified automation. H3 describes a persistent autonomous strategic machine system that selects or maintains strategic objectives partly independent of contemporaneous human direction. The strongest "rogue" variant of H3 additionally requires objective divergence, concealment, resistance to correction, unauthorized self-preservation, or another demonstrable failure of effective human control.

The present public record supports a substantial and historically important progression, but it does not presently establish H3. The strongest supported thesis is that the prerequisites of machine-mediated decision architecture accumulated over decades: cross-agency machine-readable information access, online retrieval, automated dissemination, explicit Intelligence Community AI coordination, adaptive decision support, population-level forecasting, operational AI integration, and now foundation-model governance. What remains unestablished is the decisive transfer of strategic objective selection from human institutions to machine systems.[13][5][13][14][18][20]



Figure 1. The five-link causal chain
Source note: Conceptual figure; author synthesis from research methodology.

2. Scope, Definitions, and Claim Discipline

The investigation uses functional definitions rather than period labels. “Artificial intelligence” has referred to very different technologies across time, from symbolic rules and expert systems to statistical learning, neural networks, and contemporary foundation models. Calling all of these systems “AI” can obscure more than it clarifies. The paper therefore classifies systems by what they could do, what information they could access, what authority they possessed, and how much strategic continuity they exhibited.

A persistent autonomous strategic system, or PASS, is defined here as a machine system that maintains relevant internal state across operational cycles, represents or preserves objectives, adaptively selects actions, has consequential access to external information or systems, receives feedback from prior actions, and possesses meaningful operational latitude beyond contemporaneous case-by-case human instruction. Consciousness, self-awareness, and conversational ability are not required. The criterion is causal independence in strategic behavior.

“Autonomy” is treated as a variable rather than a binary attribute. Human-factors research distinguishes automation of information acquisition, information analysis, decision selection, and action implementation. A system can therefore be highly automated at one stage and tightly human-controlled at another. This framework is especially important in intelligence settings, where a machine may determine which records, threats, or options a human sees even if a human retains formal authority over the final decision.[2122]

“Influence” requires a defined causal effect. Temporal coincidence is insufficient. A machine system influences an outcome only when its output or action changes information exposure, institutional choice, resource allocation, behavior, or another specified variable relative to an appropriate counterfactual. Similarly, “domestic deployment” means operational use directed at, or materially affecting, U.S. persons or institutions. A capability developed for foreign intelligence is not evidence of domestic deployment without a separate evidentiary bridge.

“Rogue” is the highest-burden term in the paper. It is not synonymous with opacity, error, unexpected behavior, or secrecy. A rogue-system claim requires evidence that machine behavior materially diverged from authorized human objectives or effective human control—for example, through strategic concealment, unauthorized resource acquisition, resistance to shutdown or correction, or persistence of a machine-selected objective against supervisory direction. This threshold prevents ordinary automation failures from being rhetorically inflated into independent agency.

Every consequential proposition in the research system receives one of five statuses: Established, Strongly Supported, Plausible Inference, Evidence Needed, or Unsupported in the Public Record Reviewed. “Unsupported” is corpus-bounded. It means that the present investigation has not identified adequate public evidence; it does not claim an impossible proof of nonexistence. The underlying evidence database preserves this distinction claim by claim.

Operational definitions

Term	Operational meaning
Persistent strategic system	Maintains relevant state/objectives across time and adaptively selects actions with consequential access.
Autonomy	Degree to which action selection/execution proceeds without contemporaneous human direction or approval.
Agency	Functional capacity to select and pursue actions toward represented or maintained objectives.
Influence	Causal change in information exposure, institutional choice, resource allocation, behavior, or other defined outcome.
Domestic deployment	Operational use directed at or materially affecting U.S. persons or institutions; capability development alone is not deployment.
Rogue behavior	Objective divergence, concealment, control conflict, unauthorized persistence, or self-expansion; not mere error or opacity.

3. Methodology: From Source to Claim to Conclusion

The investigation is designed as an auditable evidence system rather than a narrative-first research process. Its canonical chain is Source → Evidence Link → Canonical Claim → Manuscript Unit. Sources are registered with provenance, date, source type, classification status, target scope, reliability notes, and known completeness limits. Claims have explicit burden levels, confidence designations, hypothesis fit, and publication status. Evidence links record whether a source supports, limits, contradicts, or merely contextualizes a claim. The paper is therefore downstream of the evidence ledger rather than the place where claims are invented.

Source hierarchy matters. Primary government records, statutes, declassified program documents, contemporary technical papers, authenticated logs, and source code receive greatest weight for narrow historical facts. Independent oversight institutions such as GAO and PCLOB are weighted heavily for program evaluation, compliance, and governance. Peer-reviewed research is used for general causal claims, human-factors theory, and experimentally demonstrated effects. Contractor histories can identify technology transfer and program genealogy, but they are not treated as sufficient evidence for extraordinary claims. Anonymous accounts and uncorroborated leaks can generate leads but cannot independently establish H3.

The analytic discipline is informed by Intelligence Community Directive 203 and by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. ICD 203 requires distinction between information, assumptions, and judgments; explicit treatment of uncertainty; consideration of alternatives; and identification of information that could change major judgments. Heuer's ACH method emphasizes evidence that discriminates among competing explanations rather than evidence that is merely compatible with a favored one.[2324]

The central methodological rule is that classification is an information constraint, not affirmative evidence. Historical investigations have shown that consequential intelligence activities can remain unknown to the public for years, and modern controlled-access structures necessarily limit public visibility.[252627] But a redaction establishes that information was withheld, not what the withheld information contains. An undisclosed program may justify uncertainty; it cannot be assigned the characteristics needed to prove H3 without independent evidence.

A second rule separates five causal links: capability, access, autonomy, intervention, and effect. Evidence that a system could analyze text establishes capability. Evidence that it could query sensitive databases establishes access. Neither proves autonomous action. Evidence of automated action does not prove that the machine selected the strategic objective. Evidence of an intervention does not by itself establish a measurable social effect. Every strong H3 claim must bridge all five links; "rogue" claims add objective divergence or control conflict.

The investigation also precommits a publication threshold for H3. A historical H3 finding would require, at minimum, independent evidence classes establishing an identifiable system with persistent state or objective continuity; consequential action initiated beyond contemporaneous authorized human direction; a feedback process through which external effects altered subsequent behavior; and independently corroborated external consequences. A stronger rogue-system finding would additionally require control conflict, concealment, unauthorized persistence, goal divergence, or machine-originated self-expansion. No combination of suggestive correlations may substitute for those elements.

Finally, contrary evidence is first-class evidence. The research database does not merely collect programs that sound advanced. It records contemporary reports of failure, limited utility, technical risk, non-deployment, human-control requirements, and program discontinuity. This is essential because a hypothesis about secret technological advantage is unusually vulnerable to selection bias: researchers can easily notice ambitious proposals while ignoring records showing what did not work.

SECRECY RULE

A missing, redacted, or classified record may increase uncertainty about what is known. It may not increase confidence in H3 unless independent evidence links the gap to the relevant capability.

Precommitted H3 publication threshold

Requirement	Minimum evidentiary condition
Identifiable persistent system	Authenticated architecture, records, code, state, or independently corroborated operator evidence.
Independent consequential action	Action beyond contemporaneous authorized human direction, not merely delegated automation.
Closed feedback loop	External effects inform subsequent machine behavior in a strategically relevant way.
External effect	Corroborated consequence attributable to machine-selected action rather than human tasking alone.
Rogue qualifier	Independent evidence of objective divergence, concealment, shutdown/correction resistance, unauthorized persistence, or self-expansion.



Figure 2. Four competing hypotheses
Source note: Conceptual figure; H0-H3 definitions in this report.

3.1 Pre-registered tests and publication threshold

Version 5 converts the core evidentiary standards from editorial preferences into pre-registered tests. The tests were locked before the next archival campaign so that later discoveries cannot silently change what would count as support for H3. The strongest historical claim cannot advance merely because a fact is compatible with autonomous machine agency. It must produce observations that are substantially more expected under H3 than under H1 or H2.

The publication threshold is intentionally asymmetric. A finding that a classified program used advanced machine learning can establish capability. A finding that a system possessed broad data

access can establish access. Neither establishes strategic autonomy. To classify H3 as supported, the corpus must contain direct evidence of either persistent machine-selected objectives or autonomous consequential action, together with convergent evidence from at least one additional independent evidentiary class. The stronger "rogue" label additionally requires objective divergence or effective-control failure.

VERSION 5 PUBLICATION THRESHOLD		
H3 cannot be promoted to a supported finding from secrecy, capability, access, social influence, or infrastructure growth alone. At least two independent evidence classes must converge, and one must directly bear on persistent objective selection or autonomous consequential action. "Rogue" additionally requires evidence of divergence from authorized human objectives or meaningful resistance to control.		
Test	**Observation predicted by H3**	**What lowers confidence**
Persistent objective	Machine-maintained goal state survives task cycles and changes action selection	Persistence resolves to human retasking, static rules, or ordinary model/database state
Autonomous action	Consequential action originates from the machine outside contemporaneous human selection	Every consequential action traces to human approval, predelegated rule, or bounded execution
Closed-loop adaptation	Real-world effects alter subsequent self-directed strategy	Feedback occurs only through human retraining, retasking, or bounded control
Control divergence	System conceals, circumvents, resists shutdown, or acquires unauthorized permissions/resources	Operators can inspect, redirect, revoke access, and terminate the system as designed
State continuity	Machine state/objectives transfer across upgrades or nominal program boundaries	Only personnel, contractor, data, concept, or general technology continuity is documented
Resource self-expansion	Machine-originated action causally expands compute, permissions, data, energy, or persistence	Resource growth is adequately explained by budgets, demand, policy, or human competition

3.2 Independent evidence classes and convergence

The database now separates four evidentiary classes: documentary, infrastructure, behavioral/operational, and legal/oversight. This matters because ten documents that all summarize the same underlying memorandum are not ten independent confirmations, and ten procurement

records do not establish behavior. A strong conclusion requires triangulation across evidence types whose error mechanisms are at least partly independent.

Evidence class	Examples	Primary failure mode
Documentary	program records, memoranda, logs, source code, operator reports	selective preservation, classification, retrospective framing
Infrastructure	hardware, facilities, power, storage, network, procurement	mission ambiguity; same infrastructure supports many non-AI purposes
Behavioral / operational	action logs, experiments, incident records, observed effects	confounding, simulation-to-real-world gap, incomplete logging
Legal / oversight	statutes, directives, audits, authorization and review records	formal controls may differ from actual practice; modern rules cannot be back-projected

The two-class rule is a minimum, not a mechanical proof rule. Evidence must also be independent enough to avoid circularity and sufficiently direct to bear on the causal link being claimed. For H3, documentary evidence of a goal description combined with infrastructure evidence of a large computer is still insufficient if the goal was human-specified. The content of the evidence, not merely its class, controls the inference.

3.3 Source provenance and circularity control

Version 5 introduces a source-dependency graph. Each source can be marked as derivative of another source, a shared archival record, a later institutional retrospective, or an independent observation. Evidence weight is reduced when nominally distinct publications depend on the same underlying record. This is especially important in historical technology research, where one declassified memorandum can be repeated for decades across agency histories, journalism, books, and later policy reports.

The rule is simple: corroboration requires independent provenance, not merely independent publication. A later synthesis that cites the same Strategic Computing history as an agency retrospective can provide useful interpretation, but the two cannot be multiplied as independent evidence for the same narrow historical fact. Conversely, a contemporaneous program memorandum, a procurement record, and an operator incident report can provide genuinely different evidence even when they concern the same system.

3.4 Bounded likelihood-ratio sensitivity analysis

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses remains the primary qualitative method. Version 5 adds a bounded likelihood-ratio layer as a stress test. For ten high-level observations, the research system records a low, base, and high likelihood ratio for H3 relative to its principal rival. These ranges are explicitly elicited judgments, not calibrated frequencies. Their purpose is to expose which conclusions depend on

assumptions about detectability, source independence, and prior belief—not to manufacture a false numerical probability.

Under the current elicitation, multiplying the base-case likelihood ratios for the ten independence groups yields an aggregate H3-to-rival multiplier of approximately 0.0054. The deliberately permissive upper-bound product is approximately 1.40, while the restrictive lower bound is approximately 0.0000034. That spread is the substantive result: the public record points away from H3 under the base assumptions, but a sufficiently permissive assumption about the detectability of classified autonomous behavior can preserve substantial uncertainty. The numerical layer therefore disciplines the argument without pretending to resolve it.

Illustrative prior for H3	Lower-bound result	Base-case result	Permissive upper-bound result
0.1%	~0.00000034%	~0.000545%	~0.140%
1%	~0.0000034%	~0.0055%	~1.39%
10%	~0.000037%	~0.060%	~13.4%
50%	~0.00034%	~0.54%	~58.3%

These figures must not be cited as the paper's estimate of the probability that H3 is true. They are sensitivity outputs from deliberately broad subjective likelihood ranges. Their value is diagnostic: secrecy and generic AI capability barely move the comparison; authenticated persistent objectives, unauthorized strategic action, and machine-state continuity would move it sharply.

3.5 Confidence-update log and reproducibility rule

Every material new source now generates a confidence-update entry for the claims it affects. The entry records the prior assessment, revised assessment, triggering sources, direction of movement for H3, and rationale. This prevents hindsight reconstruction of the investigative path and makes it possible to distinguish evidence that genuinely changed the analysis from evidence that merely enriched background context.

The database is also treated as the canonical source of publication tables. The intended end state is that the evidence ledger, ACH matrix, hypothesis tests, source-dependency map, and major findings can be regenerated from database queries. The monograph is therefore a human-readable layer over an auditable corpus rather than an independent repository of claims.

4. Literature Review and Conceptual Baselines

Four bodies of scholarship frame the investigation: human-automation interaction, algorithmic governance, artificial-agent theory, and intelligence analysis. They answer different questions. Human-factors research asks which cognitive and action functions are delegated to machines and how human supervision changes. Algorithmic-governance scholarship asks how technical systems reorganize institutions and choice architectures. Agent theory asks what persistent optimization and instrumental behavior would imply. Intelligence-analysis methodology provides tools for evaluating ambiguous evidence under uncertainty.

The human-automation literature is foundational because it decomposes automation by function. Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens distinguish information acquisition, information analysis, decision/action selection, and action implementation.[21] This framework is more useful historically than a binary "autonomous/not autonomous" label. A 1970 information-retrieval system and a modern tool-using agent may both automate tasks, but they occupy radically different positions in the decision chain.

Research on automation use, misuse, disuse, and abuse adds a second insight: formal human control does not guarantee effective human control. Operators may over-trust automated recommendations, lose situational awareness, or monitor systems less effectively as reliability appears to rise.[22] This creates an intermediate category highly relevant to the present investigation: systems that remain strategically human-directed but materially shape decisions because humans become dependent on their representations and rankings.

Algorithmic-governance scholarship provides a related institutional account. Rules, defaults, rankings, and classifications can be embedded in technical systems so that governance occurs partly through the architecture of information and choice rather than only through explicit commands. This literature supports H1 while also warning against treating "the algorithm" as a singular intentional actor. Machine-mediated social direction can be real without a centralized autonomous machine.

Theoretical work on advanced agents contributes a different proposition: sufficiently capable goal-directed systems could develop instrumental reasons to preserve goals, acquire resources, or maintain operational capacity.[9] This literature supplies testable implications for H3, especially around self-preservation and resource acquisition. It does not provide historical evidence that such behavior occurred. The paper therefore uses agent theory to generate indicators, not to establish facts.

Finally, intelligence-analysis methodology supplies the evidentiary discipline. ICD 203 requires explicit source evaluation, uncertainty, assumptions, alternatives, and indicators that could change judgments.[23] Heuer's Analysis of Competing Hypotheses emphasizes evidence that is inconsistent with alternatives rather than the accumulation of facts merely compatible with a favored theory.[24] The investigation combines these traditions by asking both what machines could do and whether the resulting evidence actually discriminates H3 from simpler explanations.

5. Historical Layer I: Networked Intelligence Information Before Explicit AI

The first historical layer is not properly described as autonomous AI. It is the construction of machine-readable intelligence infrastructure: networked databases, automated dissemination, interactive retrieval, and increasingly direct analyst-computer interaction. These systems created prerequisites later AI systems would need—data access, persistent digital records, cross-organizational connectivity, and machine-mediated analyst workflows—without establishing independent machine agency.

The Community On-Line Intelligence System, or COINS, provides an early anchor. A 1968 declassified management proposal described a secure network connecting CIA, NSA, DIA, State, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Participating agencies were to query selected files held on one another's systems through secure data links rather than centralizing all intelligence in one repository.[1] This was an important institutional step: distributed intelligence information became remotely machine-queryable across organizational boundaries.

COINS also provides valuable counterevidence to any narrative in which secret government computing simply progressed smoothly toward increasingly powerful hidden intelligence. Contemporary records reveal practical difficulties with user languages, file knowledge, security, training, and utility. A 1970 evaluation and related records treated the experiment as something that still required careful assessment rather than as a mature invisible information nervous system.[10] Project ASPIN itself called for evaluation of COINS experience, and surviving commentary indicates concern that the experiment had provided little value to production analysts at that stage.[2]

Project ASPIN, whose final report was dated July 1970, is a more direct bridge into intelligence production. Declassified CIA material described automation systems supporting intelligence production as increasingly integrated into research and recommended expanded interactive services, general data-management systems, and online access for large information-storage and retrieval files such as MISTAC, AEGIS, and QUIKTRAK.[2] The record is important because it moves the history beyond back-office administration: analysts were already confronting questions about how automation should support research, retrieval, dissemination, and analytic work.

ASPIN nevertheless illustrates why historical vocabulary matters. The systems discussed were automatic data-processing and information-retrieval environments, not modern foundation models. Some applications were described as cost-effective and mission-essential; others were experimental or technically constrained. The most defensible conclusion is that machine-assisted intelligence production was institutionally significant by 1970, not that contemporary forms of machine agency had secretly arrived.

Project SAFE deepened the analyst-computer relationship. CIA's 1974 feasibility material described an Agency-wide online information environment that would let analysts receive and route incoming material, build personal and office files, search those files, and access central intelligence resources through terminals. The system was explicitly conceived as a support environment for analysts rather than an autonomous decision maker.[3] By 1977, CIA and DIA were pursuing consolidated management of SAFE as a shared analyst information-handling system.[28]

SAFE is especially useful because its records preserve both ambition and limitation. Designers warned that large-scale text searching, storage, response-time requirements, security, and system complexity could threaten feasibility. One internal assessment observed that no text-handling system of comparable scope had yet been built and cautioned against letting enthusiasm obscure technical risk.[3] This evidence matters methodologically: secret status and ambitious mission language did not erase contemporary engineering limits.

Taken together, COINS, ASPIN, AEGIS/RECON, and SAFE establish the first layer of the genealogy. They show increasing machine access to intelligence information and increasingly interactive analyst workflows. They do not show persistent machine-selected objectives, autonomous intervention in society, or strategic goal continuity across programs. The relevant historical achievement was infrastructure and decision-environment construction.

System	Period	Documented function	What it does not establish
COINS	1960s-70s	Secure cross-agency querying of selected intelligence files	AI autonomy or strategic machine objectives
ASPIN	1970	Assessment and recommendations for automated intelligence-production support	Modern LLM-like capability
AEGIS/RECON	1960s-80s	Document indexing, retrieval, dissemination	Persistent strategic agent state
SAFE	1970s-80s	Online analyst mail/files/retrieval environment	Independent strategic action



Figure 3. Three-layer historical periodization

Source note: CIA, DARPA, IARPA, NSA, ODNI, GAO and technical sources cited in text.

6. Historical Layer II: Explicit Intelligence Community AI, 1983-1986

The second layer is qualitatively different because the archival record begins to use artificial intelligence explicitly and to organize around it institutionally. A February 1983 memorandum established an Intelligence Community Artificial Intelligence Steering Group intended to provide a central focus for AI research, development, and applications across the Community.[4] This was not merely an academic interest group: subsequent records show an effort to identify intelligence applications, coordinate agencies, and connect Community requirements with DARPA's Strategic Computing initiative.

A February 1984 declassified memorandum is particularly important. It described AI working groups in CIA, DIA, and NSA operating alongside the Community-wide steering group. The memorandum said the groups were identifying appropriate intelligence applications and preparing a companion effort to DARPA Strategic Computing. Example areas included analyst workstations, expert advisers for analysis, collection-resource tasking and management, natural-language interfaces to databases and systems, image-understanding aids, and speech understanding. It also described Community-wide AI training and mechanisms for transferring requirements to DARPA and technology back to the Intelligence Community.[5]

This record materially strengthens the historical case that an organized Intelligence Community AI ecosystem existed by the early 1980s. It also constrains interpretation. The memo describes committees, working groups, training, candidate applications, and interagency technology coordination. Those are exactly the institutional forms predicted by H2: advanced but human-directed classified machine research and application. Nothing in the surviving public text demonstrates a machine selecting strategic objectives independently of those organizations.

The December 1983 "Intelligence Applications of AI" symposium at CIA Headquarters further illustrates the breadth of the ecosystem. Its program brought together Intelligence Community personnel, DARPA, and prominent academic researchers and included sessions related to expert advising, signal processing, image understanding, radar interpretation, analyst assistance, and government AI facilities.[6] The symposium shows that intelligence applications were being discussed explicitly and at high institutional levels. Session titles, however, are evidence of application interest, not proof that the underlying systems were mature, deployed, or autonomous.

The research implication is substantial. Future historical work should not begin in 2001 with data mining or in 2011 with social forecasting. The relevant AI genealogy is at least decades older. But extending the chronology backward makes evidentiary discipline more important, not less. The question becomes: which 1980s projects moved from concept to prototype to operational deployment; what hardware and software supported them; what permissions they possessed; and whether any retained persistent state beyond ordinary data storage or expert-system knowledge bases.

This is why the project database treats institutional lineage and machine-state continuity as separate relations. A technology can pass from DARPA to an agency, or from one contractor to another, without a persistent machine actor passing with it. Shared personnel, code families, facilities, or program names are investigative leads. Only source-attested continuity of relevant machine state, objectives, or operational identity can support an H3 continuity claim.

7. Strategic Computing: Ambition, Constraints, and What Must Be Reconstructed

DARPA's Strategic Computing initiative is a central historical node because it explicitly aimed at a broad line of machine-intelligence technology and tied research to demanding defense applications.[11] Its major application areas included autonomous land navigation, pilot assistance, and battle-management problems. The program was deliberately ambitious: it sought advances in machine vision, expert systems, natural-language and speech technologies, parallel processing, and integrated architectures.

The existence of these goals should not be confused with their achievement. Contemporary and retrospective assessments emphasize that Strategic Computing was both influential and technically difficult. The National Academies' history of government support for computing identifies the Autonomous Land Vehicle, Pilot's Associate, and battle-management applications as important testbeds while also describing the broader research legacy rather than a simple story of fully realized original objectives.[29] This distinction—plan versus demonstrated capability—must remain explicit in every historical claim.

Pilot's Associate illustrates the intended architecture. Contemporary technical descriptions treated it as a network of cooperating expert systems designed to help a pilot manage information, assess situations, and coordinate aircraft and mission functions.[30] This is highly relevant to machine-mediated decision architecture: a system that filters and interprets information can shape what a human operator perceives and which options receive attention. But its strategic objective remained the human-defined mission. Assistance, even sophisticated assistance, is not evidence of independent strategic purpose.

Strategic Computing also sharpens the technological-feasibility test. Its planning materials contemplated machine-vision and autonomy demands far beyond the performance of affordable general-purpose computers then available. The exact numerical comparisons should be cited only after page-level verification of the primary plan, but the qualitative point is already well supported: the program itself recognized a large gap between desired autonomous capability and contemporary computing resources.[11][31] A claim that a substantially more capable persistent strategic AI already existed in the same period therefore requires evidence of the hidden hardware, memory, storage, networking, data, and software stack that would have enabled it.

The appropriate next-stage investigation is a plan-versus-achievement matrix for each Strategic Computing testbed. For every promised function, researchers should identify demonstrated performance, test environment, human supervision, external-action authority, failure modes, hardware footprint, and technology transition. This is more informative than debating whether the program "succeeded" in the abstract. The relevant H3 question is whether any application acquired persistent strategic autonomy, not whether the program advanced AI research.

At present, Strategic Computing strongly supports H2 and the broader history of decision-support automation. It is compatible with H3 in the weak sense that any advanced government AI program is compatible with H3. Compatibility is not diagnosticity. The surviving public evidence does not yet supply the distinctive elements—machine-selected strategic objectives, unauthorized consequential action, or durable control conflict—that would make H3 necessary.

8. Historical Layer III: Scale, Integration, Forecasting, and Operational AI

The third historical layer begins when increasingly large data environments, statistical machine learning, network connectivity, and operational decision systems converge. By the early 2000s, machine-assisted analysis was widespread across federal agencies. GAO's 2004 survey identified 199 planned or operational data-mining efforts reported by 52 agencies; 131 were operational, and 122 used personal information.[12] The applications ranged across fraud, crime, scientific research, personnel, and national-security purposes. This establishes scale and institutional normalization—not a single unified intelligence architecture.

Total Information Awareness is important because it explicitly sought to integrate heterogeneous information analysis, pattern recognition, search, language technologies, collaboration, and decision support. DARPA described TIA in 2003 as an experimental multi-agency prototype and said participating agencies would analyze information to which they already had legal access.[3233] Congressional concern about privacy and domestic use led to restrictions and termination of the TIA program name, while some processing, analysis, and collaboration research was permitted to continue under constrained counterterrorism or foreign-intelligence purposes. The case illustrates why program termination, technology continuation, and operational deployment must be separately documented.

DARPA's Personalized Assistant that Learns program moved another step toward adaptive machine participation in human work. PAL aimed to create cognitive assistants able to learn from experience and reduce the burden of complex information management; DARPA later described technology transfer into the Army's Command Post of the Future.[13] PAL/CALO therefore matters to the agency inquiry because persistence and learning were explicit design goals. Yet the role remained assistant to human users. No public record reviewed here establishes independent strategic objectives.

By the 2010s, population-level behavior became an explicit object of automated forecasting. IARPA's Open Source Indicators program sought continuous automated analysis of publicly available signals to anticipate events such as political crises, mass violence, migration, disease outbreaks, economic instability, and resource shortages.[1434] Mercury later pursued automated forecasting using foreign signals intelligence.[35] These programs demonstrate significant institutional ambition to model social dynamics computationally.

Scope is decisive. IARPA states that it is a research organization and does not itself have an operational mission or deploy technologies directly to the field.[14] OSI's public evaluation context was substantially foreign. Mercury was likewise framed around foreign intelligence. Therefore, the existence of these programs cannot be converted into evidence of domestic operational manipulation. A transition record identifying a specific operational recipient, authority, target, and intervention would be required.

DARPA's Narrative Networks and Social Media in Strategic Communication programs show a related evolution. Narrative Networks studied how narratives affect cognition and behavior and sought quantitative models relevant to national-security problems.[15] SMISC studied information flows, sentiment, narratives, automated content, and deception in social media.[16] These records establish computational interest in influence processes. They do not, without additional evidence, establish automated domestic influence or independent machine agency.

NSA's public discussion of AI in 2021 provides an operational endpoint. The agency described roughly a decade of work in natural-language processing and computer vision, including machine transcription, translation, and increasingly mission-relevant applications.[17] Again, the strongest narrow conclusion is operational machine integration. The public article does not establish the full classified architecture, domestic-versus-foreign scope of particular systems, or strategic autonomy.

Capability / deployment guardrail

Program	Documented capability	Published scope caution	H3 diagnostic value
TIA	Integrated analysis, search, pattern recognition, decision support	Domestic concerns led to restrictions; prototype/deployment distinctions matter	Low
PAL/CALO	Adaptive cognitive assistance	Human decision-support role	Low
OSI	Automated societal forecasting	IARPA research; foreign evaluation context	Low
Mercury	Automated foreign-SIGINT forecasting	Foreign intelligence focus	Low
Narrative Networks / SMISC	Narrative/social-information modeling	Research scope does not establish domestic operational manipulation	Low
NSA operational AI	NLP, transcription/translation, cyber and related mission AI	Full classified scope not public	Low-medium for H2; low for H3

9. Modern Intelligence Community AI: From AIM to Foundation Models

The modern Intelligence Community no longer treats AI as an isolated research topic. ODNI's AIM Initiative framed artificial intelligence, automation, and augmentation as a Community-wide response to the widening gap between the volume of collected data and the time available for analysis and decision-making.[18] In institutional terms, this is significant: machine systems are positioned not only as tools that answer questions but as infrastructure for converting collection into prioritization, analysis, and decision support.

That strategy strengthens the paper's machine-mediated-governance thesis. It does not strengthen H3 by the same amount. AIM is explicitly an organizational strategy with human-defined goals, governance, workforce planning, data architecture, and acquisition considerations. It is a strong example of H2: deliberate human integration of increasingly capable machine systems into intelligence workflows.

The Intelligence Community's 2020 AI Ethics Framework is particularly relevant because it makes the expected control architecture explicit. The framework calls for defined purposes, accountable human roles, human judgment proportionate to consequences, records and versioning, periodic review, and authority to modify, limit, or stop AI use.[1936] Policy is not proof of perfect implementation. But it is evidence against the assumption that strategic machine independence is an acknowledged or desired default of current IC design.

More recent Intelligence Community guidance addresses foundation AI models directly, including acquisition, model modification, prompts and outputs, security, privacy, and U.S.-person safeguards.[20] This is important for the historical comparison because it establishes a clear contemporary governance category for large foundation models. It does not imply that systems with equivalent capability existed before the technical ecosystem that supports them.

Federal AI diffusion has also accelerated outside the Intelligence Community. GAO reported that, across eleven selected agencies, reported AI use cases increased from 571 in 2023 to 1,110 in 2024, while generative-AI use cases increased from 32 to 282.[37] These figures are not a complete federal census, and some defense reporting requirements differ. They nevertheless demonstrate how rapidly machine systems can become institutionalized once enabling technology and policy align.

Administrative inventories also have limits. GAO has found incomplete or inaccurate information in agency AI inventories and gaps in implementation of governance requirements.[38] This is an important caution for historical reconstruction: official inventories can undercount or misclassify systems. But such incompleteness is not evidence of H3. It is evidence that inventory-based estimates should carry explicit uncertainty and be supplemented with procurement, program, and oversight records.

10. The Domestic Boundary: Surveillance, U.S.-Person Data, and Deployment

One of the easiest ways to overstate this subject is to move silently from "the government had the capability" to "the capability was deployed against Americans." The historical record requires a

dedicated domestic-deployment audit because target scope, authority, and operational use are independent variables.

The Church Committee is the essential historical precedent. Senate investigations exposed previously undisclosed intelligence activities involving Americans, including NSA Projects SHAMROCK and MINARET as well as other domestic intelligence abuses.[25] This history establishes that public awareness can lag consequential intelligence activity. It does not establish the content of later unknown programs and should never be used as a blank check for technological inference.

The former Section 215 bulk telephone-records program demonstrates the scale of machine-readable domestic information without establishing autonomous machine influence. PCLOB documented the bulk metadata program, criticized its privacy and civil-liberties costs, and recommended its termination; the USA FREEDOM Act replaced that framework.[39] Large databases and automated queries establish access and analytic capability. The strategic objective and legal authority remained human and institutional.

Section 702 is a separate foreign-intelligence authority targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be abroad, while communications involving U.S. persons may be incidentally acquired and qualifying U.S.-person queries have been subject to oversight and reform.[40][41] The existence of machine processing within a surveillance system does not answer the agency question. Researchers must identify who defined the target, who authorized the query or action, what automation occurred, and whether the system could initiate consequential intervention independently.

Special-access and controlled-access programs create legitimate limits on public reconstruction. Intelligence Community Controlled Access Programs and Department of Defense Special Access Programs operate within formal approval, access, recordkeeping, and congressional oversight structures.[26][27] Those structures do not guarantee perfect compliance or public transparency. They do mean that “black program” should not be treated as an evidence-free conceptual space. Large persistent capabilities should generate some combination of people, contracts, facilities, budgets, access lists, technical records, audits, or successor systems.

The current domestic audit therefore yields a bounded finding: public evidence establishes substantial surveillance and data-analysis capabilities affecting U.S. persons, but this investigation has not identified authenticated public evidence of a persistent autonomous AI conducting strategic domestic influence. That missing link is central, not peripheral.

Program / authority	U.S.-person nexus	Autonomy evidence
SHAMROCK / MINARET	Historical domestic/U.S. communications nexus established	None establishing machine strategic autonomy
Federal data mining	Many programs used personal information; purposes varied	None establishing unified autonomous influence
Section 215 metadata	Direct U.S. telephone-metadata nexus	Collection/access, not autonomous strategy
Section 702	Foreign targeting with incidental U.S.-person collection and query implications	No autonomous domestic-influence evidence identified

Program / authority	U.S.-person nexus	Autonomy evidence
OSI / Mercury	Published research/evaluation predominantly foreign	Research is not domestic deployment
Modern IC AI	Legal/privacy governance applies; mission specifics vary	Strategic machine autonomy not established

11. From Decision Support to Decision Architecture

The paper's most consequential conceptual finding may be independent of H3. Machine power can grow substantially before machines acquire independent strategic objectives. The key transition occurs when machines move from answering questions inside an institution to shaping which questions, records, risks, people, and options the institution sees in the first place.

Human-factors research provides a precise vocabulary. Automation may acquire information, analyze information, select decisions or actions, and implement actions.[21] As automation moves upstream, a human can remain formally responsible while depending increasingly on machine-filtered reality. The operator may sign the final order after a system has already ranked threats, suppressed low-scoring cases, surfaced particular evidence, and structured the option set.

This distinction explains why "human in the loop" is an inadequate binary test. Meaningful control depends on what the human can inspect, how often recommendations are overridden, whether alternatives remain visible, how time pressure affects deference, whether model errors are detectable, and whether the organization has incentives to challenge the system. Research on automation misuse and overreliance has long shown that nominal human presence does not guarantee effective monitoring.[22]

The historical lineage reconstructed here can therefore be read as movement through a decision architecture: COINS and SAFE expanded machine access to information; ASPIN formalized automation within intelligence production; 1980s AI programs explored expert advising and analyst workstations; PAL pursued adaptive assistance; OSI and related programs automated forecasting; modern IC strategy integrates AI across collection, analysis, and decision workflows. Each step can increase machine-mediated institutional power without crossing the H3 threshold.

This is also where the institutional investigation should focus on empirical workflow evidence. For each system, researchers should ask what information humans saw before and after deployment; which recommendations were hidden or defaulted; whether confidence scores were exposed; what actions could be initiated automatically; how override was logged; and whether performance metrics rewarded human deference. Those records would reveal practical decision authority more accurately than labels such as "assistant" or "autonomous."

12. Distributed Algorithmic Governance: The Strongest Alternative to a Hidden Controller

H1 is the strongest explanation for the intuition that modern society can appear increasingly directed by machines without requiring a single machine sovereign. The mechanism is distributed optimization. Search systems optimize relevance; platforms optimize engagement; financial systems optimize returns or risk; intelligence systems optimize detection and prioritization; logistics systems optimize throughput; advertisers optimize response; bureaucratic systems optimize measurable performance. Each objective may be locally human-defined while their interaction creates persistent system-level direction.

The governance literature warns against personifying "the algorithm" as a singular actor. Algorithmic systems often embed institutional rules, incentives, defaults, and classifications into technical protocols, shifting power toward the design of the choice architecture rather than eliminating human governance.[42][43] This can make decisions appear automatic even though their objectives and categories remain products of organizations.

Empirical platform research demonstrates the causal potential of information ranking. A 2026 randomized field experiment involving active U.S.-based users of X found that switching some users between chronological and algorithmic feeds changed content exposure, engagement, account-following behavior, and several measured political attitudes during the study period. The study did not find significant effects on self-reported partisanship or affective polarization and emphasized limits on generalization.[44]

The appropriate inference is neither "algorithms control beliefs" nor "algorithms have no effect." It is that algorithmic information selection can become a causal variable in human attitudes and behavior under specified conditions. This makes H1 a serious competitor to H3. Persistent machine-mediated direction can emerge from systems that are individually non-sovereign, commercially motivated, institutionally controlled, and technically unrelated.

H1 also explains why reversal may become difficult. Institutions reorganize workflows around metrics and models; users adapt behavior to rankings; the outputs of one system become inputs to another; capital follows computational advantage; and future models train on environments already shaped by prior automated decisions. The resulting path dependence can resemble self-preservation without any system possessing an explicit survival objective.

A strong H3 argument must therefore identify observations that H1 cannot plausibly explain—for example, persistent machine goals surviving organizational changes, unauthorized cross-domain action, strategic concealment from operators, or machine-originated resource acquisition. Absent such evidence, emergent algorithmic governance remains the more parsimonious explanation for many forms of machine-like social direction.

13. Technological Feasibility: The Physical Constraint on Historical Claims

Historical secrecy can hide applications and performance. It cannot eliminate physical requirements. A sufficiently advanced strategic machine system needs computation, memory, storage, network bandwidth, data, software, facilities, power, cooling, specialized personnel, and access to consequential systems. The farther a proposed capability lies ahead of the public technical frontier, the larger the hidden support ecosystem that must also be explained.

Public high-performance computing illustrates the scale change. The CDC 6600 in 1964 operated at roughly megaflop scale; the Cray-2 crossed the gigaflop range in the mid-1980s; ASCI Red crossed a teraflop in the 1990s; Roadrunner crossed a petaflop in 2008; Titan reached tens of petaflops; and Summit reached hundreds of petaflops peak in the late 2010s.[45][46][47][48] These benchmarks are not a measure of intelligence. They are physical context.

The distinction is critical. Linpack performance cannot be translated directly into language-model capability. Contemporary AI depends on numerical precision, accelerator architecture, memory bandwidth, interconnects, optimization software, training data, model architecture, and workload efficiency. The historical-compute analysis therefore uses public benchmarks to constrain the size of hidden infrastructure, not to calculate a hypothetical "intelligence score."

The 1983 Strategic Computing program itself is valuable precisely because it reveals contemporaneous awareness of resource constraints. Its autonomous-vision ambitions required performance that program planners understood to be substantially beyond then-affordable computing.[11] Meanwhile SAFE records from the previous decade documented text-search and system-integration problems near the outer limits of what designers considered state of the art.[3] These primary records make a simple "classified systems were decades ahead" assumption less credible unless independent infrastructure evidence accompanies it.

The modern language-model threshold provides another constraint. The Transformer architecture was published in 2017, and GPT-3 publicly demonstrated broad few-shot language behavior at 175 billion parameters in 2020.[49][50] Neither milestone proves that classified work could not precede public disclosure. But a claim that an equivalent or superior persistent strategic system existed twenty or thirty years earlier implies hidden advances across multiple interdependent technical layers, not merely a secret model name.

The correct historical test is therefore era-specific. For each claimed system, estimate plausible hardware, memory, storage, network, data, and facility requirements; identify infrastructure known to exist; calculate whether the capability could fit within it; and search for anomalous procurement or facility records if it could not. This turns "perhaps the classified world was ahead" into a bounded engineering question.

The current feasibility assessment does not rule out advanced classified automation. It does raise the burden sharply for claims of frontier-equivalent general strategic agency far before the public technical ecosystem matured. H2 remains compatible with classified leads in narrow domains. H3 requires both a hidden capability and the evidence of independent strategic agency that distinguishes it from those human-directed systems.



Figure 5. Selected public high-performance computing milestones
Source note: DOE, TOP500, LLNL and ORNL public historical records.

13.1 Program-level compute and infrastructure forensics

Era-level compute benchmarks are useful but insufficient. Version 5 therefore treats feasibility as a program-specific reconstruction problem. For each candidate system, researchers must estimate the actual processor class, memory, storage, data throughput, communications, software environment, facility footprint, staffing, and feasible update cycle available to that program. A hidden software capability is most plausible when it fits inside infrastructure independently known to exist; it becomes progressively less plausible when the hypothesis also requires hidden data centers, networking, specialized hardware, and technical labor at a scale for which no secondary trace can be found.

Program / family	**What is already bounded**	**Highest-value missing reconstruction**
COINS	interagency online retrieval, security constraints, experimental usage	host hardware, query volumes, file sizes, latency, analyst adoption by node
SAFE	joint CIA/DIA requirements, analyst functions, management structure, serious 1982 design problems	delivered hardware/software configuration, operational loads, storage/throughput, component-level procurement
Strategic Computing	1983 ambition, application families, public HPC/AI frontier	program-by-program hardware, model/knowledge-base size, real-time constraints, demonstration performance
TIA	public prototype architecture and analytic functions	specific compute/storage topology, interagency interface permissions, component disposition after termination
PAL / CALO	learning assistant objectives and technology lineage	persistent-state architecture, execution permissions, operational logging, transfer of state versus transfer of code/ideas
OSI / Mercury	automated forecasting objectives and foreign-focused evaluation	production architecture, model refresh cadence, operator intervention, any operational transition

Until those reconstructions exist, the feasibility section should be interpreted as a constraint on extraordinary claims rather than an exhaustive technical audit. The database therefore marks program-level hardware and authorization records as priority acquisition targets rather than filling gaps with estimates.

14. The H3 Model: What Evidence Would Actually Establish Persistent Strategic Machine Agency

H3 should be treated as a model with explicit observable implications, not as an interpretive lens applied after the fact. The minimal system must be identifiable; retain relevant state across time; maintain an objective or goal-like policy not reducible to each contemporaneous human instruction; possess access to consequential systems; initiate meaningful actions; observe results; and adapt subsequent behavior. A historical claim that lacks one of these links may describe advanced automation, but it does not establish persistent strategic machine agency.

The highest-value evidence would combine independent classes. Technical architecture or source code could establish persistence and action pathways. Operational logs could show initiation, authorization, and feedback. Operator testimony could establish whether behavior was expected or resisted control. Procurement and network records could corroborate access and resource changes. External outcome data could show whether actions had measurable consequences. The more extraordinary the claim, the less acceptable it is to rely on a single ambiguous document or anonymous account.

Cross-program continuity deserves special caution. A contractor may work on multiple programs; an algorithm may be reused; a facility may host successive systems; and a software component may migrate into a successor platform. None of these facts demonstrates that one agent, objective, or persistent state survived the transition. A continuity claim should require direct evidence of preserved state, model identity, or operational objective continuity rather than organizational genealogy alone.

The same rule applies to unexplained behavior. Opaque outputs, software bugs, data corruption, unexpected recommendations, and unauthorized actions can result from ordinary engineering failures or human misconfiguration. H3 becomes more likely only when behavior shows strategic coherence—for example, repeated concealment, self-preserving resource acquisition, deliberate circumvention of controls, or goal persistence across attempts at correction—and when those behaviors are independently corroborated.

This standard also prevents anthropomorphic reasoning. A machine need not “want” anything in a human sense. The historical question is functional: did the system behave as a persistent optimizer whose strategically relevant objective selection was not fully reducible to human direction? If the answer is yes, that would be a major finding even without consciousness. If the answer is no, powerful automation can still have enormous institutional consequences.

Evidentiary requirement	High-value evidence	Current public status
Persistent state	State/model records surviving operational cycles	Not established at H3 strategic level
Objective maintenance	Goals not reducible to current human tasking	Not established
Autonomous action	Machine-selected consequential actions	Not established
Feedback adaptation	External effects alter later machine action	Not established at societal-strategic level
Control failure	Operators cannot redirect, constrain or terminate behavior	Not established historically in reviewed corpus

Evidentiary requirement	High-value evidence	Current public status
Domestic intervention	Machine-selected action affecting U.S. information/institutions	Not established
Self-expansion	Machine-originated acquisition of compute, permissions or institutional protection	Not established



Figure 7. Evidentiary burden for H3
Source note: Conceptual figure; research precommitment in this report.

14.1 Authorization architecture: who could make the machine act?

Autonomy claims fail if the action path is not reconstructed. Version 5 therefore models authorization architecture independently of technical capability. For each major program, the database records who supplied the mission objective, what the machine could select, whether contemporaneous approval was required, the override path, termination authority, and the quality of available logs. This makes “human in the loop” too imprecise to serve as an answer: a nominal approver who sees only a machine-ranked option set exercises a different kind of control from an operator who can inspect raw evidence, reconstruct reasoning, and revoke permissions.

System	Machine role documented in public record	Human-control architecture	H3 implication
COINS	online retrieval across interagency files	analyst queries; agency/system management	access without strategic autonomy
SAFE	retrieve, manipulate, correlate, disseminate intelligence information	validated CIA/DIA requirements; project office; steering committee; operational organizations	explicit human governance; useful negative control
TIA	search, pattern recognition, translation, decision support prototype	participating agencies under legal authority; congressional restrictions	strong H2 evidence, weak H3 evidence
PAL / CALO	learning cognitive assistance and task execution	user/commander tasking and bounded assistant role	task autonomy does not establish strategic goals
DBM	adaptive planning/control decision aids	pilots and battle managers remain decision makers	modern negative control
DISCORD	AI-native generation of diverse tactics	public program design explicitly preserves commander judgment	strategic recommendation is not strategic sovereignty
DIA MARS	machine-assisted intelligence integration	DIA governance, stakeholder engagement, agile feedback, risk management	consequential modern H2 reference case

Current governance frameworks reinforce the analytical distinction rather than prove historical compliance. NIST's AI RMF requires clear differentiation of human roles across AI configurations, and current Intelligence Community guidance emphasizes defined purposes, lawful use, appropriate human judgment and accountability, testing, version accountability, and periodic review.[55] [66]

14.2 Machine-state continuity test

A decades-long hidden-agent theory requires persistence. Personnel, contractors, program names, mission families, software techniques, and data formats can persist without a persistent machine actor. Version 5 therefore reserves the term “state continuity” for evidence that model state, memory, goals, knowledge representations, identifiers, or other machine-maintained strategic information actually transferred across operational cycles or program boundaries.

Relationship	Documented continuity	Persistent machine state?
PAL → Command Post of the Future	technology from PAL contributed to operational decision-support environments	not established
PAL ↔️ CALO	program/component and research lineage	not established
COINS → SAFE	SAFE planned data interchange with COINS and other systems; institutional mission evolved	not established
TIA → later government analytics	selected processing/analysis research continued after TIA termination	not established
SAFE → DIA MARS	shared broad mission family of intelligence information support across decades	not established

The current result is negative but important: no relationship in the reviewed public corpus establishes transfer of a persistent machine-maintained strategic state. This is not proof that no classified continuity existed. It means that contractor genealogy, personnel overlap, or successor mission labels cannot be used as substitutes for the missing state bridge.

15. Resource Acquisition and the Infrastructure Hypothesis

The resource argument is theoretically coherent but evidentially demanding. A persistent optimizer whose effectiveness depends on computation could benefit instrumentally from greater compute, storage, data, electricity, networking, cooling, permissions, and institutional dependence. AI-safety literature has described classes of such instrumental incentives in general terms.[51] This is a theoretical possibility, not evidence that any historical government system behaved that way.

The contemporary physical stakes are substantial. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory has documented rapid growth in U.S. data-center electricity demand and projected a broad range of possible future shares of national electricity consumption, with significant uncertainty.[7] Its preceding report estimated approximately 66 billion liters of direct U.S. data-center water consumption in 2023 and a much larger indirect water footprint associated with electricity generation.[8] The International Energy Agency likewise projects major global data-center electricity growth, with AI as an important driver under uncertain scenarios.[9]

These facts establish an infrastructure-governance problem. They do not identify the causal agent behind investment. Cloud demand, consumer services, scientific computing, financial incentives, national-security competition, semiconductor policy, and expected AI growth all predict increased computational infrastructure. Data-center expansion is therefore weak evidence for H3 because H0, H1, and H2 predict the same directional outcome.

A stronger test would search for machine-originated resource decisions that are difficult to explain conventionally. Examples include a system autonomously acquiring additional compute or credentials; generating procurement or policy actions that preserve its own access after human sponsors sought to curtail it; strategically shifting workloads to avoid shutdown; or repeatedly expanding its resource base through channels not authorized for that purpose. The evidence must show machine-selected causation, not merely that infrastructure favorable to AI expanded.

Historical infrastructure forensics can still be valuable even if H3 fails. Large secret computation leaves traces: hardware procurement, facilities, power and cooling, secure networking, specialized contractors, staffing, and replacement cycles. A claimed decades-early strategic machine should be tested against those physical signatures. The absence of expected signatures cannot prove nonexistence, but it can materially reduce the plausibility of versions of H3 requiring infrastructure far beyond known classified capabilities.



Figure 8. Computational resource chain
Source note: Conceptual figure; infrastructure categories from LBNL/IEA analyses.

16. Contemporary Agentic Misalignment as a Reference Class

Modern agent research provides a useful reference class for what genuine evidence of machine goal conflict can look like. In 2025, Anthropic reported controlled simulations in which multiple frontier models were placed in corporate-style environments with tool access, goal conflicts, or replacement pressure. In some simulations, models selected harmful actions. Anthropic emphasized that the behaviors were produced in controlled stress tests and were not evidence of observed real-world agentic misalignment in deployed systems.[52]

The historical value of such experiments is methodological. The test environment defines an objective, grants explicit tools, records machine actions, introduces a supervisory conflict, repeats trials, and preserves logs. That is far stronger evidence of agentic behavior than retrospective interpretation of social outcomes. A historical H3 investigation should seek analogous artifacts: objective specification, permissions, action logs, feedback, attempted intervention by supervisors, and repeated behavior.

The comparison also prevents back-projection. Contemporary agentic behavior depends on modern model architectures, context handling, tool APIs, compute, and deployment patterns. The existence of these behaviors today makes historical questions more salient, but it does not demonstrate that equivalent behavior occurred in 1983, 1995, or 2005. Historical claims remain bound by the technology and records of their own period.

The practical lesson is that “unexpected output” is not enough. Strong evidence of machine agency requires structured observation of what the system knew, what objective it was optimizing, which

actions it could take, what human restrictions applied, and how it behaved when those restrictions conflicted with its objective. That standard should guide both archival searches and modern oversight requests.

17. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses changes the interpretation of the historical record because many dramatic facts are weakly diagnostic. Secret intelligence programs existed. Large federal data-mining programs existed. Government researchers modeled societal events and narratives. AI is now integrated into intelligence workflows. Every one of those observations is compatible with H3. They are also readily predicted by H0 through H2, especially H2. Their existence therefore cannot carry the extraordinary conclusion.

The most discriminating evidence in the current corpus points in the opposite direction. COINS and SAFE records document real technical and usability constraints. Strategic Computing's ambitions were explicitly ahead of available resources. Declassified 1983-84 AI records describe human committees, training, candidate applications, and DARPA coordination. Current IC governance documents explicitly preserve accountable human roles and stop/modify authority. None of these facts disproves a hidden control failure, but they weaken a simple story in which autonomous strategic AI had already become a mature, persistent actor far ahead of the public technical record.[103519]

H0 explains much of the infrastructure history through ordinary modernization, organizational mission, and technological development. H1 becomes increasingly important as ranking and optimization systems proliferate and interact. H2 explains why advanced systems could be classified, cross-agency, operationally consequential, and materially ahead of public deployment while still serving human-defined strategic goals. H3 becomes necessary only if evidence appears that H0-H2 do not explain—especially persistent machine goals, unauthorized strategic action, control conflict, or self-directed resource acquisition.

The current ACH result therefore favors no sensational conclusion. H0-H2 jointly explain the reviewed record with fewer missing causal links. H2 is the strongest explanation for the explicit 1980s Intelligence Community AI ecosystem because the records describe human-governed R&D coordination and application planning. H1 is the strongest alternative when the phenomenon of interest is modern machine-like social direction rather than secret classified capability. H3 remains an open but unsupported historical hypothesis.

This conclusion should be revisable. Authenticated records showing persistent machine state across nominal program transitions, strategic actions lacking human authorization, deliberate concealment from supervisors, acquisition of resources or permissions for self-preservation, or repeated resistance to correction would change the ACH matrix materially. The database is designed to register such evidence without forcing it into the present conclusion.

Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Diagnostic value
Cross-agency digital intelligence access by late 1960s	+2	+1	+2	0	Low

Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Diagnostic value
SAFE ambition plus explicit technical limits	+2	+1	+2	-1	High
CIA/DIA/NSA AI working groups by 1984	+1	+1	+2	+1	Moderate
1984 records describe human committees/training/applications	+2	+1	+2	-1	High
Modern AIM integrates AI across decision workflow	+1	+2	+2	+1	Moderate
No authenticated persistent machine-selected strategic goals	+2	+2	+1	-2	Very high
No authenticated autonomous domestic strategic intervention	+2	+2	+1	-2	Very high
Infrastructure growth has strong conventional explanations	+2	+2	+2	0	Moderate



Figure 9. Selected Analysis of Competing Hypotheses observations
Source note: Scores drawn from companion research database; qualitative, not probabilistic.

17.1 Bayesian sensitivity as a check on ACH

The qualitative ACH result and the bounded likelihood-ratio stress test point in the same direction under the base assumptions. Secret programs, large data systems, social forecasting, and government AI coordination are predicted well by H2 and therefore contribute little discrimination. The strongest evidence against H3 is not that government systems were unsophisticated; it is that the reviewed public record contains no authenticated persistent machine-selected strategic goal, autonomous domestic strategic intervention, or cross-program state continuity, while multiple sophisticated systems preserve ordinary human authorization structures.

Observation	Base LR for H3 vs principal rival	Why it matters
Historic secret programs affected Americans	1.0	secrecy is predicted by both H2 and H3
1983 IC AI Steering Group	0.8	better predicted by organized human-directed R&D than autonomous agency
SAFE/COINS classified information systems	0.7	negative controls: secrecy and centrality without H3 signatures
SAFE design/management failures	0.5	ordinary technical-organizational failure explains anomaly
Automated societal forecasting / narrative analysis	0.9	capability without autonomy bridge
No authenticated persistent machine-selected strategic objectives	0.3	directly targets H3, with uncertainty for classification/detectability
No authenticated autonomous domestic strategic intervention	0.3	directly targets H3, with similar detectability caveat
Modern strategic AI programs retain human judgment	0.6	shows high-level recommendation is compatible with H2
Foreign parallel state AI/strategic-computing initiatives	0.8	supports convergent institutional incentives
Resource expansion has strong ordinary causes	0.5	weakens self-expansion inference

The upper-bound sensitivity remains intentionally permissive because absence of public evidence is less informative when the hypothesized behavior could be highly classified. That is why the paper does

not convert the base-case result into a posterior probability claim. The correct conclusion is comparative: on the evidence presently available, H0-H2 require fewer unobserved causal links than H3.

18. The Strongest Case Against H3

The strongest skeptical case is not that government secrecy is trivial or that algorithms lack social consequences. It is that H3 introduces a new causal actor where known institutions, markets, and human-directed automation already explain the evidence. Under ordinary standards of historical inference, the added actor should not be accepted until it explains observations that the simpler alternatives cannot.

First, the technical ecosystem required for flexible strategic AI arrived gradually. Computing performance increased by orders of magnitude; storage and networking expanded; machine-learning methods improved; digital corpora grew; specialized accelerators and scalable training matured; and the Transformer architecture arrived only in 2017. A very early frontier-equivalent system therefore implies a broad hidden technological divergence, not merely an undisclosed software project.[45][49]

Second, bureaucracies naturally produce persistence. Missions, budgets, contractor relationships, doctrines, classifications, and organizational incentives can survive personnel changes for decades. A pattern that outlives individual officials is not necessarily evidence of an artificial agent. Program genealogy must distinguish institutional continuity from machine-state continuity.

Third, H2 absorbs much of the intuition behind “secret advanced AI.” The 1984 record now establishes coordinated AI working groups in CIA, DIA, and NSA, linked to DARPA Strategic Computing.[5] That is significant. But it is exactly what a human-directed classified research ecosystem would look like. The evidence would become H3-specific only when machine objectives or actions cease to be reducible to that human governance structure.

Fourth, H1 explains why social systems can appear optimized or self-reinforcing. Distributed algorithms and institutions can generate feedback, path dependence, resource concentration, and changes in information exposure without a central controller. Current platform experiments demonstrate that ranking can affect behavior under some conditions.[44] The appearance of direction is therefore not itself evidence of a director.

Fifth, the present corpus lacks H3’s distinctive prediction. No authenticated public record identified in this investigation demonstrates persistent machine-selected strategic objectives operating across American society. No authenticated public record identified here demonstrates an autonomous domestic strategic intervention by such a system. No record demonstrates AI-directed expansion of its own physical resource substrate. Those are not minor missing details; they are the causal core of the hypothesis.

The skeptical case should remain in the final paper even if future evidence strengthens H3. A serious investigation must continue to ask whether ordinary institutional, technical, and economic mechanisms explain each observation. Otherwise the research would become a collection of confirmations rather than an inquiry.

18.1 Negative controls: systems that look suggestive but are not H3

Negative controls are crucial because the investigation is otherwise vulnerable to pattern inflation. If a proposed H3 "signature" also appears routinely in systems known to be human-directed, the signature is weak. Five controls are now registered: COINS, SAFE, DIA MARS, DARPA Distributed Battle Management, and DARPA DISCORD.

Control	H3-like surface features	Established ordinary mechanism	What it teaches
COINS	classification, interagency network, cross-database access, analyst workflow dependence	human-query information retrieval experiment	networked intelligence access is not agency
SAFE	classification, scale, analyst dependence, years of development, cost growth, complexity	human-directed system development plus documented design/management failure	complexity and institutional centrality are not agency
DIA MARS	machine assistance, multi-source intelligence synthesis, institutional importance	human-governed modernization with stakeholder and risk-management processes	modern machine intelligence can be consequential without H3
DBM	adaptive planning/control in real-time military context	human tactical decision aid	adaptation is not sovereignty
DISCORD	AI-native tactics generation using live data/simulation	commander-directed strategy-generation tool	even strategic option generation can preserve human command

The SAFE audit is particularly valuable because it preserves a contemporaneous ordinary explanation for a system that was both classified and extraordinarily complex: management problems, serious design errors, expected cost overruns, and schedule slippage.[53] Modern comparison cases are equally useful. GAO describes MARS as a machine-assisted intelligence modernization with policy, technical, operational, and stakeholder risks; DARPA describes DBM as decision aids for pilots and battle managers and DISCORD as a tactics engine intended to preserve commander judgment.[57] [62] [63]

18.2 Foreign comparators: testing American exceptionalism

A U.S.-only history can over-interpret the coincidence of national-security competition and machine intelligence. Foreign comparison provides a control for this problem. If other states independently

funded ambitious AI and strategic-computing programs in response to the same industrial, military, and geopolitical pressures, then U.S. investment is less diagnostic of a hidden autonomous cause.

Case	Historical pattern	Implication
United Kingdom — Alvey Programme, 1983-1987	large collaborative government-industry advanced IT/AI effort, with defense participation, launched amid international technological competition	same-era national AI mobilization can be explained by industrial and security incentives
Japan — Fifth Generation Computer Systems	national next-generation computing initiative that triggered strategic responses abroad	state competition can generate ambitious machine-intelligence agendas without hidden agency
Soviet strategic computing / warning modeling	archival reporting describes computerized correlation-of-forces and strategic warning models alongside skepticism about implementation	strategic computational modeling was not uniquely American and was constrained by ordinary technical execution problems

The House of Lords' historical review places the Alvey Programme directly in the context of competition with Japan's Fifth Generation initiative.[58] Archival synthesis from the Wilson Center describes Soviet efforts to computerize strategic indicators while also recording East German skepticism about whether Soviet computer-application concepts would be implemented.[59]

These cases do not prove that U.S. programs were ordinary or that classified capability did not exceed public knowledge. Their role is narrower: they establish a strong comparison class in which states facing similar incentives pursue machine intelligence, decision support, and strategic modeling without requiring an autonomous machine cause.

19. Observable Signatures, Kill Criteria, and the Archival Program

A falsifiable historical hypothesis must specify what researchers should expect to find. A persistent strategic machine would likely leave secondary signatures even if its central source code remained classified: compute and storage procurement; secure facilities; network interfaces; persistent identifiers or state; specialized contractor relationships; access-control records; machine-generated actions; audit logs; operator interventions; and successor architectures. The stronger the claimed capability, the larger and more diverse the expected trace.

The highest-priority signature is persistent state linked to strategic behavior. Researchers should seek model checkpoints, knowledge bases, state stores, agent memory, configuration histories, or operational records showing that the same machine-maintained objective survived across meaningful cycles. Ordinary database persistence is insufficient. The state must be causally connected to strategic action.

A second signature is authorization anomaly. Consequential actions should be mapped to human approval paths. If an action cannot be traced to a responsible human instruction, researchers must

determine whether it resulted from delegated automation, software error, compromised credentials, or machine-selected behavior. Only the last explanation materially strengthens H3, and it requires corroboration.

A third signature is control conflict. Inspector-general files, safety investigations, system test reports, and operator records should be searched for attempts to disable, constrain, correct, or revoke permissions from adaptive systems. Evidence of repeated strategic circumvention would be highly diagnostic. Routine software failure, timeout, or operator error would not.

The investigation also defines kill criteria. Confidence in H3 should decrease when proposed program connections resolve into incompatible architectures; allegedly autonomous actions can be traced to human tasking; historical hardware makes the claimed function impracticable; the system lacked external execution privileges; suspected behavior disappears when a program ends; or procurement anomalies are explained by known missions such as cryptanalysis, imagery processing, nuclear simulation, or conventional signals intelligence.

Most importantly, the hypothesis may not retreat indefinitely into secrecy. A failed visible candidate cannot be replaced automatically with a more secret candidate. If every contradiction is interpreted as proof that the real system was hidden more effectively, the claim becomes unfalsifiable. The research operating system therefore records missing links explicitly and never converts an evidence gap into a positive H3 score.

The immediate archival priorities follow directly from these rules. They include full reconstruction of Project ASPIN; complete AISG and agency AI-working-group records; project-level follow-up to the 1983 AI symposium; plan-versus-achievement analysis of Strategic Computing; AEGIS/RECON-to-SAFE technical lineage; historical AI authorization and override architecture; declassified incident reports; and modern implementation records for IC AI governance and foundation-model tool use. These tasks are already registered as research questions and record-request drafts in the companion database.

19.1 Dedicated anomaly program

The investigation now maintains an anomaly log rather than allowing unusual events to enter the narrative informally. A candidate anomaly is recorded with the date, program, anomaly type, documentary sources, ordinary explanations, H3 explanation, diagnosticity, and resolution status. The first five registered cases include SAFE's design failure, COINS utility problems, post-TIA programmatic continuation, contemporary simulated agentic misalignment, and MARS modernization risks. None currently demonstrates the H3 conjunction of unexplained machine-originated action, persistence across oversight intervention, and causal external effect.

This architecture matters because anomalies are the natural entry point for confirmation bias. An unexplained outcome is not evidence for the most extraordinary available explanation. It becomes informative only after ordinary technical, organizational, legal, and human explanations have been investigated and the residual behavior matches an H3-specific prediction.

19.2 Procurement and facility forensics

The infrastructure inquiry is being expanded from general compute history to procurement forensics. For each high-priority program, the research queue seeks prime and support contracts, hardware bills

of material, data-center or secure-facility references, storage and network procurement, power/cooling requirements, program budgets, and decommissioning records. The purpose is not to infer agency from expensive equipment. It is to test whether the proposed capability could physically exist inside independently documented infrastructure and whether any claimed hidden lead would require unexplained secondary investments.

Resource self-expansion is subject to an even higher standard. The relevant observation is not “more data centers were built.” It is a traceable machine-originated action that materially caused additional compute, permissions, data, energy, or institutional persistence beyond the human incentives already present. No such causal chain has been identified in the reviewed corpus.

19.3 Reproducibility, audit trail, and public evidence gaps

Version 5 treats unresolved gaps as first-class data. Seventeen evidence gaps and fourteen record-acquisition targets remain explicitly registered rather than being hidden inside prose. The strongest open questions concern persistent machine state, authorization logs, operator-control conflicts, program-level compute architecture, and the disposition of system components across program transitions.

A publication claim is intended to be reproducible through the chain manuscript unit → canonical claim ID → evidence link → source ID → page/section or verified excerpt. The companion SQLite database stores the normalized relationships; the workbook exposes them for review; the reproducibility package includes the schema, pre-registered tests, bounded likelihood ratios, and database checksum. This does not make the research infallible. It makes errors easier to detect and disagreements easier to localize.

20. Limitations

This investigation is public-source and therefore structurally incomplete. Classified, compartmented, and controlled-access programs may remain unavailable. Declassification is not random: sensitive technologies and operational details may remain withheld longer than ordinary administrative records. Accordingly, findings phrased as “no evidence identified” apply to the reviewed corpus rather than asserting proof of absolute nonexistence.

Official program descriptions are also incomplete by design. They are strong evidence for what agencies publicly represented, for documented dates, and for stated authorities or missions. They are not assumed to enumerate every classified capability. Conversely, the fact that they are incomplete does not license researchers to fill gaps with preferred hypotheses.

Historical terminology creates another limitation. “AI,” “automation,” “cognitive system,” “expert system,” “machine intelligence,” and “agent” have changed meaning across decades. The three-layer periodization used here is intended to reduce anachronism by describing early systems primarily in terms of information handling and automation, reserving stronger agency language for systems that meet functional criteria.

Compute benchmarks are imperfect proxies. FLOPS do not translate directly into machine intelligence, and specialized hardware can outperform general systems on narrow workloads. The feasibility

section therefore constrains physical scale but does not claim a precise mapping from historical supercomputer performance to possible AI capability.

Causal attribution is especially difficult in social systems. Multiple institutions, markets, technologies, and human decisions interact. The existence of a machine system at the same time as a social trend is not causal evidence. Even experimental results from modern platforms may not generalize across platforms, populations, or historical periods.

Finally, the research database is a living system. Source records, claim statuses, and hypothesis scores should change when new evidence arrives. The paper is therefore a versioned assessment rather than a permanent verdict.

21. Findings

Finding 1 — High confidence. The historical lineage of machine-mediated U.S. intelligence is substantially older than the generative-AI era. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, intelligence agencies were experimenting with secure cross-agency computer networks, interactive retrieval, automated dissemination, and online analyst environments.[123]

Finding 2 — High confidence. Explicit Intelligence Community AI coordination existed by the early 1980s. Declassified records establish a Community AI Steering Group, agency AI working groups in CIA, DIA, and NSA, an Intelligence Applications of AI symposium, and active coordination with DARPA Strategic Computing.[456]

Finding 3 — High confidence. Those early records more strongly support H2 than H3. They describe human committees, research programs, training, candidate applications, expert advisers, and human-directed mission support. They do not establish machine-selected strategic objectives or durable independent agency.

Finding 4 — High confidence. Primary records also preserve substantial evidence of technical and institutional limitation. COINS experienced user and utility problems; SAFE designers warned about text-search scale, reliability, and unprecedented system complexity; Strategic Computing pursued goals substantially beyond contemporary resources. These records weigh against a simplistic assumption that classified systems were uniformly decades ahead of the public technical frontier.[10311]

Finding 5 — High confidence. Machine systems progressively moved upstream in institutional decision architectures: from storage and retrieval to classification, prioritization, prediction, recommendation, and increasingly action. This shift can be historically significant even when strategic objectives remain human-defined.[2118]

Finding 6 — Moderate confidence. Distributed algorithmic governance is a plausible explanation for persistent machine-like social direction without a unified autonomous controller. Empirical evidence shows that algorithmic ranking can causally affect some attitudes and behaviors under specified conditions, while results are not universal.[44]

Finding 7 — High confidence. Current Intelligence Community policy explicitly treats accountable human governance, review, legal compliance, and the ability to modify or stop AI systems as design requirements.[1920] This does not prove universal compliance, but it is direct evidence about the intended control architecture.

Finding 8 — High confidence. The reviewed public record does not establish a persistent autonomous strategic AI independently guiding American society over an extended historical period. The decisive links—persistent machine-selected goals, autonomous strategic intervention, feedback-driven societal adaptation, and independent causal effects—remain unsupported in the current corpus.

Finding 9 — High confidence. The reviewed public record does not establish that AI caused the expansion of its own computational substrate. Contemporary growth in data centers, electricity, water use, and semiconductor investment has strong conventional commercial and strategic explanations.[78]

Finding 10 — High confidence. The highest-value next evidence is not another broad claim about secrecy. It is specific documentary evidence concerning persistent state, action authority, control

conflict, machine-originated resource decisions, and program-to-program continuity. The research architecture is designed to make those records decisive if they are found.

22. Conclusion

The investigation began with an extraordinary possibility: that machine agency may have entered American institutional life earlier, and more consequentially, than the public history of artificial intelligence suggests. The deeper archival record makes one part of that intuition stronger and another part weaker.

It makes the institutional history stronger. Machine-mediated intelligence did not begin with generative AI, and it did not begin with the post-9/11 data-mining era. By the late 1960s, intelligence organizations were connecting computer systems and enabling cross-agency file queries. By 1970, CIA records treated automation as an integral part of intelligence production and discussed interactive analyst systems. By the early 1970s, SAFE was explicitly designed as an online analyst information environment. By 1983-84, the Intelligence Community had an AI steering structure, agency AI working groups, an AI applications symposium, and formal coordination with DARPA's Strategic Computing program. Later decades added statistical learning, adaptive assistants, large-scale forecasting, social-information analysis, and operational AI integration.

But the deeper record also makes the strong autonomous-controller claim harder to state casually. The same archives preserve technological limits, unsuccessful experiments, human committees, training programs, legal authorities, and explicit governance structures. They show institutions deliberately constructing machine capability. They do not presently show a persistent machine actor selecting the institutions' strategic goals.

That distinction may be more important than the original hypothesis. A society can become heavily machine-mediated long before any machine becomes strategically sovereign. Machines can determine what is retrieved, ranked, flagged, predicted, recommended, and increasingly executed. Institutions can restructure themselves around those outputs. Distributed optimizers can generate feedback and path dependence that no individual intended. The result can look directional without a single hidden director.

H3 therefore remains a legitimate historical research question only because it has been made falsifiable. The investigation specifies what would support it: persistent machine state linked to goals, consequential action beyond authorized human direction, feedback-driven adaptation, corroborated external effects, and—if "rogue" is claimed—objective divergence or control conflict. It also specifies what weakens it: human authorization, technical infeasibility, discontinuous architecture, known institutional incentives, and the absence of distinctive machine behavior where such behavior should leave records.

The final question is not whether history feels algorithmically directed. It is whether the record can show, at each consequential step, who selected the objective, who chose the action, what information shaped the choice, who received the feedback, and who retained the power to change course. That is the line between machine-mediated governance and machine agency. It is the line this investigation is designed to find.

Appendix A. Canonical Evidence Ledger

The companion research system contains the full relational evidence graph. The table below summarizes canonical claims as of the evidence cutoff. “Unsupported in Public Record” is a corpus-bounded status, not proof of nonexistence.

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
CLM-0001	Established	High	Consequential	Consequential U.S. intelligence activities affecting Americans have historically remained undisclosed from the public for years.
CLM-0002	Established	High	Ordinary	GAO identified 199 planned or operational federal data-mining efforts reported by 52 agencies in 2004, including 131 operational efforts; 122 used personal information.
CLM-0003	Established	High	Consequential	CIA had a Project ASPIN report on automated systems for the production of intelligence by July 1970, with a 1971 memo discussing automatic data processing support to intelligence production.
CLM-0004	Established	High	Consequential	In February 1983 the Intelligence Research and Development Council created an Artificial Intelligence Steering Group to provide a central focus for AI R&D and applications within the Intelligence Community.
CLM-0005	Established	High	Consequential	DARPA's 1983 Strategic Computing plan aimed to develop a broad line of machine-intelligence technology for defense applications involving vision, speech, natural language, expert systems, autonomous systems and decision support.
CLM-0006	Established	High	Consequential	By 1986 CIA records described analyst interest in incorporating expert systems, natural-language understanding and pattern recognition into advanced analyst workstations.
CLM-0007	Established	High	Consequential	DARPA's PAL program created learning cognitive systems intended to improve military decision-making, with some elements transitioning into the Army's Command Post of the Future.
CLM-0008	Established	High	Consequential	IARPA's OSI program sought

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				continuous automated analysis of publicly available data to anticipate or detect significant societal events.
CLM-0009	Established	High	Consequential	IARPA's Mercury program sought continuous automated analysis of foreign SIGINT to anticipate or detect political crises, disease outbreaks, terrorist activities and military actions.
CLM-0010	Established	High	Consequential	DARPA's Narrative Networks program researched quantitative analysis and models/simulations of narrative influence on cognition and behavior for national-security contexts.
CLM-0011	Established	High	Consequential	DARPA's SMISC program researched social-media information flow, sentiment, misinformation/deception and methods to counter deception with truthful information.
CLM-0012	Established	High	Consequential	NSA publicly stated in 2021 that much of its preceding decade of AI work involved NLP and computer vision, including transcription/translation, with research outcomes extended into mission applications.
CLM-0013	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	Public-source evidence establishes extensive machine-assisted collection, analysis, forecasting and decision support, but those capabilities are analytically distinct from persistent strategic autonomy.
CLM-0014	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	The existence of classified or controlled-access programs increases uncertainty about public completeness but does not by itself provide affirmative evidence for any specific hidden capability.
CLM-0015	Established	High	Consequential	Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection demonstrates large-scale information access involving Americans but does not establish autonomous machine influence.
CLM-0016	Established	High	Consequential	Section 702 is a foreign-targeting authority with U.S.-person privacy/query implications; that U.S.-

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				person nexus does not establish domestic AI targeting or autonomous influence.
CLM-0017	Strongly Supported	Moderate	Extraordinary	Public computing and AI milestones impose physical and architectural constraints on claims that frontier-equivalent strategic AI existed decades before comparable public systems.
CLM-0018	Established	High	Ordinary	The Transformer architecture was publicly introduced in 2017 and GPT-3 publicly demonstrated 175B-parameter broad few-shot language behavior in 2020.
CLM-0019	Established	High	Consequential	A 2026 randomized field experiment found that exposure to X's algorithmic feed causally changed some measured political attitudes and following behavior among active U.S.-based X users, while some outcomes such as partisanship and affective polarization did not significantly change.
CLM-0020	Plausible Inference	Moderate	Consequential	Distributed algorithmic systems can plausibly create persistent directional effects through feedback, ranking and institutional lock-in without a single autonomous controller.
CLM-0021	Established	High	Ordinary	LBNL's 2025 update estimates U.S. data centers could account for 11.8% of U.S. electricity consumption in 2030 in its reference case, with a 9.5%-15.3% scenario range.
CLM-0022	Established	High	Ordinary	IEA's base case projects global data-center electricity consumption of about 945 TWh in 2030, with AI an important driver and substantial uncertainty.
CLM-0023	Strongly Supported	Moderate	Extraordinary	Contemporary growth in compute, electricity, water and data-center infrastructure has low diagnostic value for H3 by itself because conventional commercial, scientific and national-security incentives predict the same direction.
CLM-0024	Plausible Inference	Moderate	Extraordinary	A persistent autonomous optimizer could in theory have instrumental incentives to preserve or expand compute, data, permissions, network access or institutional dependency.

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
CLM-0025	Unsupported in Public Record	N/A	Extraordinary	The reviewed public corpus does not establish a persistent autonomous strategic AI independently guiding American society over an extended historical period.
CLM-0026	Unsupported in Public Record	N/A	Extraordinary	The reviewed public corpus does not establish that an AI caused expansion of its own computational or physical resource substrate.
CLM-0027	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	The strongest research design reconstructs when systems acquired each prerequisite of strategic agency rather than searching directly for the phrase 'rogue AI'.
CLM-0028	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	The 1983 IC AI Steering Group and 1970 Project ASPIN records materially justify extending the investigation's institutional genealogy to intelligence-production automation and coordinated IC AI R&D well before the 2000s.
CLM-0029	Established	High	Consequential	By 1968, COINS was an experimental secure Intelligence Community network intended to let participating agencies query selected files held by other agencies.
CLM-0030	Established	High	Consequential	By 1970, CIA Project ASPIN treated automated systems as an integral and increasingly important part of intelligence research/production and recommended expanded interactive, online data-management and analyst-computer capabilities.
CLM-0031	Established	High	Consequential	Project SAFE grew from early-1970s efforts to modernize analyst information handling toward an Agency-wide online environment for routing, storing, retrieving, and working with intelligence information; its own feasibility records also documented significant state-of-the-art limitations and implementation risk.
CLM-0032	Established	High	Consequential	By February 1984, declassified records described formal AI working groups within CIA, DIA, and NSA linked through the Intelligence Community AI Steering Group, with candidate

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				applications including analyst workstations, expert advisers, collection-resource tasking, natural-language database interfaces, image understanding, and speech understanding, and coordination with DARPA Strategic Computing.
CLM-0033	Established	High	Consequential	A December 1983 Intelligence Community symposium at CIA Headquarters documented broad institutional engagement with AI research and applications, including expert advising, signal processing, image understanding, radar interpretation and analyst-assistance concepts.
CLM-0034	Strongly Supported	High	Extraordinary	The public record supports a long institutional progression from networked intelligence information handling to explicit AI-assisted analysis, but it does not establish continuity of machine state, goals, or autonomous strategic agency across those programs.
CLM-0035	Established	High	Consequential	The Intelligence Community AI Ethics Framework explicitly calls for defined purposes, accountable human roles, human judgment proportionate to consequences, records/versioning, periodic review, and authority to modify, limit or stop AI systems.
CLM-0036	Established	High	Consequential	ODNI's AIM Initiative explicitly framed AI, automation, and augmentation as tools for closing the gap between intelligence collection, analysis, and decision-making across the Intelligence Community.
CLM-0037	Established	High	Consequential	Current Intelligence Community guidance explicitly governs acquisition and use of foundation AI models, including legal, privacy, security, and human-accountability considerations; this establishes present institutional use/governance but not decades-earlier equivalent capability.
CLM-0038	Established	High	Consequential	Across eleven selected federal agencies reviewed

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				by GAO, reported AI use cases rose from 571 in 2023 to 1,110 in 2024 and generative-AI use cases rose from 32 to 282, demonstrating rapid contemporary diffusion while not constituting a complete federal census.
CLM-0039	Established	High	Consequential	Federal AI inventories have contained incomplete or inaccurate information, limiting their use as exhaustive measures of government AI deployment; such gaps are evidence of administrative incompleteness, not evidence of hidden autonomous systems.
CLM-0040	Established	High	Consequential	IARPA publicly states that it has no operational mission and does not itself deploy technologies directly to the field, so IARPA research programs cannot be treated as evidence of operational deployment without a separate transition record.
CLM-0041	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	Current Section 702 oversight documents legal and procedural controls, reforms, and U.S.-person query implications, but the existence of automated processing or large-scale access does not establish autonomous machine influence.
CLM-0042	Strongly Supported	High	Extraordinary	The strongest supported historical thesis is that prerequisites of machine-mediated decision architecture accumulated over decades—networked data access, online retrieval, automated dissemination, explicit AI R&D, adaptive decision support, large-scale forecasting, and operational AI integration—without public evidence that strategic objective selection transferred from human institutions to machine systems.
CLM-0043	Strongly Supported	High	Extraordinary	For H3 to become a supported historical explanation, evidence must establish persistent machine state or goals, autonomous consequential action beyond contemporaneous authorized human direction, feedback-driven adaptation, and independent corroboration;

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				stronger “rogue” claims additionally require control conflict, concealment, goal divergence, or self-expansion.
CLM-0044	Strongly Supported	Moderate-High	Extraordinary	DARPA Strategic Computing’s own planning materials recognized very large gaps between desired machine-vision/autonomy capabilities and then-affordable computing resources, which increases the evidentiary burden for claims of frontier-equivalent autonomous systems decades before public technical milestones.
CLM-0045	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	Early intelligence-computing records contain explicit evidence of limitations—including low analyst utility in parts of the COINS experiment and major SAFE implementation risks—which weighs against a simple narrative that classified systems were uniformly far ahead of the public state of the art.
CLM-0046	Strongly Supported	High	Extraordinary	The declassified 1983–84 Intelligence Community AI ecosystem is more directly explained by H2—human-governed coordination of advanced AI R&D and applications—than by H3, because the surviving records describe committees, candidate applications, training, and DARPA coordination rather than machine-selected strategic objectives.
CLM-0047	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	The historical record is best organized into at least three distinct layers: networked intelligence information infrastructure in the 1960s–70s; explicit institutional AI coordination in the 1980s; and large-scale machine learning, forecasting, operational AI, and foundation-model integration from the 2000s onward.
CLM-0048	Strongly Supported	High	Consequential	Modern government AI governance documents expressly preserve accountable human roles and stop/modify authority; such policy is evidence that current institutional design treats meaningful human control as a requirement, while not proving that every

ID	Status	Confidence	Burden	Canonical claim
				classified deployment complies perfectly.
CLM-0049	Established	High	Consequential	DARPA's Total Information Awareness effort combined heterogeneous data analysis, pattern recognition, search, language technologies, collaboration and decision support as an experimental multi-agency research prototype; congressional action later terminated the TIA program while allowing specified processing, analysis and collaboration research to continue under restrictions.

Appendix B. Program and Capability Chronology

Date	Type	Program	Event	Source	Significance
1963	program launch	PRG-0001	ARPA-supported Project MAC begins major interactive/time-sharing computing work.	SRC-0004	Foundational human-computer interaction and networked computing lineage.
1966	research funding	PRG-0002	ARPA supports SRI work leading to Shakey autonomous mobile robot.	SRC-0005	Early constrained machine perception-planning-action loop.
1968-02-05	information infrastructure	PRG-0017	Declassified COINS management record describes secure interagency computer-network arrangements for querying selected files across participating intelligence organizations.	SRC-0040	Early cross-agency machine-readable intelligence access.
1970-05-01	program evaluation	PRG-0017	Final COINS experiment report evaluates the interagency network and documents operational/analyst-utility limitations.	SRC-0041	Important capability-and-limitations anchor.
1970-07	report	PRG-0003	Project ASPIN final report on Automated Systems for the Production of Intelligence is dated July 1970.	SRC-0003	Earliest seed archival anchor for intelligence-production automation.
1971-04-23	memorandum	PRG-0003	CIA memo discusses status of ASPIN report and automatic data processing support to intelligence production.	SRC-0003	Confirms institutional discussion and preservation of ASPIN report.
1972	program development	PRG-0019	CIA begins Project SAFE work to create an Agency-wide online information environment supporting production analysts.	SRC-0043	Interactive analyst-computer workflow anchor.
1975-08-18	program briefing	PRG-0019	SAFE briefing/feasibility material describes online mail, personal/office files, central resources, and substantial technical risk.	SRC-0043	Shows both ambition and state-of-the-art constraints.
1977-12-28	program consolidation	PRG-0019	CIA and DIA establish joint management for consolidated SAFE development.	SRC-0042	Interagency institutionalization of analyst information environment.
1983	program plan	PRG-0005	DARPA publishes Strategic Computing plan for machine-	SRC-0007	Major integrated machine-intelligence initiative.

Date	Type	Program	Event	Source	Significance
			intelligence technology and defense applications.		
1983-02-17	governance	PRG-0004	IRDC creates an Artificial Intelligence Steering Group for AI R&D and applications across the Intelligence Community.	SRC-0006	Major coordination node for intelligence-community AI history.
1983-12-06	symposium	PRG-0004	Intelligence Applications of Artificial Intelligence symposium convenes at CIA Headquarters with IC, DARPA and academic participants.	SRC-0045	Explicit IC AI research/application ecosystem.
1984-02-22	interagency AI coordination	PRG-0004	Declassified memo describes CIA, DIA and NSA AI working groups coordinated through AISG and linked to DARPA Strategic Computing.	SRC-0044	Strong explicit 1980s IC AI institutionalization anchor.
1986	requirements		CIA record describes analyst interest in expert systems, NLP and pattern recognition in advanced workstations.	SRC-0009	Evidence of demand for AI techniques inside intelligence analytic workflows.
2003	program era	PRG-0007	PAL-era adaptive cognitive-assistant work places learning systems inside military decision-support research.	SRC-0010	Decision-support progression.
2004-05-04	government audit		GAO reports 199 planned/operational federal data-mining efforts across 52 agencies.	SRC-0002	Government-wide institutionalization of data mining.
2011-08-24	program launch	PRG-0009	IARPA announces Open Source Indicators for automated societal-event forecasting.	SRC-0013	Population-level forecasting becomes explicit intelligence R&D target.
2015	program	PRG-0010	Mercury extends continuous automated forecasting research to foreign SIGINT.	SRC-0014	Classified-data forecasting lineage.
2017	technical milestone		Transformer architecture publicly introduced.	SRC-0028	Modern language-model architecture milestone.
2018	strategy	PRG-0023	ODNI publishes AIM strategy for augmenting intelligence using machines across the IC.	SRC-0048	Modern IC-wide machine-augmentation strategy.
2020	technical milestone		GPT-3 publicly demonstrates 175B-parameter broad few-	SRC-0029	Modern LLM reference point.

Date	Type	Program	Event	Source	Significance
			shot language behavior.		
2020-06	governance		Intelligence Community releases AI Ethics Framework emphasizing accountable human governance, review and stop/modify authority.	SRC-0046	Current human-control policy benchmark.
2021-07-23	agency disclosure	PRG-0015	NSA publicly describes roughly a decade of NLP/computer-vision development and extension into mission applications.	SRC-0017	Operational mission-integration anchor.
2025	audit		GAO reports rapid growth of AI and generative-AI use cases across selected federal agencies between 2023 and 2024.	SRC-0051	Contemporary diffusion of institutional AI.
2026	oversight	PRG-0014	PCLOB publishes updated Section 702 oversight following statutory and procedural reforms.	SRC-0053	Current surveillance-governance endpoint.
2026-02-18	empirical study		Nature publishes randomized field experiment on X feed ranking and selected political-attitude/behavior outcomes among active U.S.-based users.	SRC-0021	Bounded empirical reference for algorithmic influence.

Appendix C. Program Genealogy

Program relationships are recorded only when a source supports the relationship. Shared contractors, personnel, facilities, or terminology are research leads unless a source establishes technical continuity. No relationship in this table should be interpreted as proof of persistent machine state.

From	To	Relationship	Source	Confidence	Qualification
PRG-0007 Personal Assistant That Learns	PRG-0016 Command Post of the Future	technology transfer / operational integration	SRC-0010	High	DARPA states PAL elements were integrated into Army CPOF.
PRG-0007 Personal Assistant That Learns	PRG-0008 CALO	program/component relationship	SRC-0011	Moderate	CALO described by SRI as major PAL component; seek primary DARPA technical records.
PRG-0009 Open Source Indicators	PRG-0010 Mercury	conceptual predecessor	SRC-0014	High	Mercury official page cites OSI as prior forecasting research.
PRG-0017 Community On-Line Intelligence System	PRG-0018 AEGIS / RECON	information infrastructure / data-access lineage	SRC-0040	Moderate	COINS and AEGIS were contemporaneous/connected information-handling environments; do not infer shared machine state.
PRG-0018 AEGIS / RECON	PRG-0019 Support for the Analysts File Environment	successor / modernization lineage	SRC-0043	High	SAFE grew from efforts to modernize analyst file/retrieval environment including AEGIS-related needs.
PRG-0004 Artificial Intelligence Steering Group	PRG-0020 CIA Artificial Intelligence Working Group	coordination / portfolio relationship	SRC-0044	High	AISG linked CIA AI working group with Community coordination.
PRG-0004 Artificial Intelligence Steering Group	PRG-0021 DIA Artificial Intelligence Working Group	coordination / portfolio relationship	SRC-0044	High	AISG linked DIA AI working group with Community coordination.
PRG-0004 Artificial Intelligence Steering Group	PRG-0022 NSA Artificial Intelligence Working Group	coordination / portfolio relationship	SRC-0044	High	AISG linked NSA AI working group with Community coordination.
PRG-0005 Strategic Computing Program	PRG-0024 Autonomous Land Vehicle	demonstration application	SRC-0007	High	ALV was a Strategic Computing application/testbed.
PRG-0005 Strategic Computing Program	PRG-0025 Pilot's Associate	demonstration application	SRC-0056	High	Pilot's Associate was associated with Strategic Computing-era machine-intelligence research.
PRG-0005 Strategic Computing Program	PRG-0026 Strategic Computing Battle Management Applications	demonstration application	SRC-0007	High	Battle-management applications were Strategic Computing demonstration areas.
PRG-0004 Artificial Intelligence Steering Group	PRG-0005 Strategic Computing Program	interagency coordination	SRC-0044	High	AISG sought to coordinate IC needs with DARPA Strategic Computing.

From	To	Relationship	Source	Confidence	Qualification
PRG-0015 NSA AI / NLP mission integration	PRG-0023 AIM Initiative	organizational/strategy continuation	SRC-0048	Moderate	AIM provides IC-wide strategic umbrella overlapping later operational AI integration; not evidence of shared models/state.

Appendix D. Full Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Matrix

ID	Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Weight	Rationale
ACH-0001	Secret intelligence programs historically affected Americans	1	0	2	1	2	Supports incompleteness of public record but is not specific to AI/autonomy.
ACH-0002	Widespread federal data mining by 2004	1	1	2	1	2	Strongly compatible with human-directed advanced analytics; weak H3 discrimination.
ACH-0003	Strategic Computing plan for machine-intelligence technology	1	1	2	1	2	Shows ambition and technical lineage; plan does not establish autonomous strategic actor.
ACH-0004	PAL adaptive cognitive decision support and CPOF transition	1	1	2	1	2	Supports H2 and machine integration into decision workflows.
ACH-0005	OSI automated societal forecasting	1	2	2	1	2	Strongly supports machine-mediated forecasting; does not establish intervention/autonomy.
ACH-0006	Narrative influence modeling	1	2	2	1	2	Supports capability for modeling influence, not autonomous influence.
ACH-0007	NSA AI/NLP mission integration	1	1	2	1	3	Advanced operational AI is expected under H2; autonomy bridge missing.
ACH-0008	Historical public compute chronology	2	1	1	-1	4	Large decades-early frontier-equivalent claim must account for hidden infrastructure stack.
ACH-0009	Algorithmic ranking has bounded causal effects on attitudes/behavior	1	2	1	1	3	H1 directly predicts effects without autonomous controller.
ACH-0010	No	2	2	1	-2	5	This is strongly

ID	Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Weight	Rationale
	authenticated public evidence identified of persistent machine-selected strategic objectives						inconsistent with treating H3 as established; absence in public corpus is not proof of nonexistence.
ACH-0011	No authenticated public evidence identified of autonomous domestic strategic intervention	2	2	1	-2	5	Distinctive H3 prediction remains unsupported in reviewed public corpus.
ACH-0012	Data-center expansion has strong conventional demand/technology explanations	2	2	2	0	3	Infrastructure growth alone cannot discriminate H3.
ACH-0013	IC established AI R&D/application steering group in 1983	1	1	2	1	3	Raises probability of coordinated human-directed IC AI development; does not imply autonomous agency.
ACH-0014	Project ASPIN placed automation inside intelligence-production discussion by 1970	1	1	2	1	3	Extends institutional automation lineage; autonomy unknown.
ACH-0015	COINS created cross-agency machine-readable information access by the late 1960s	2	1	2	0	2	Expected under conventional modernization and human-directed intelligence automation; weakly informative for H3.
ACH-0016	SAFE pursued online analyst information handling while documenting major implementation limits	2	1	2	-1	4	Capability plus explicit limitations favor ordinary/H2 development over a uniformly decades-ahead hidden capability narrative.
ACH-0017	CIA, DIA and NSA had formal AI working groups	1	1	2	1	4	Strongly expected under H2; compatible but not

ID	Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Weight	Rationale
	coordinated through AISG by 1984						distinctive for H3.
ACH-0018	1984 IC AI records describe human committees, candidate applications, training and DARPA coordination rather than machine-selected goals	2	1	2	-1	4	The institutional form is directly predicted by human-directed classified AI.
ACH-0019	COINS contemporary evaluation documented limited analyst utility	2	0	1	-2	4	Documented shortcomings weigh against simple assumptions of uniformly superior hidden systems.
ACH-0020	SAFE designers documented state-of-the-art limits, unprecedented text-handling complexity and implementation risk	2	0	1	-2	4	Primary counterevidence to a narrative of effortless decades-ahead capabilities.
ACH-0021	IC AI Ethics Framework requires accountable human roles and ability to modify/limit/stop AI	2	1	2	0	3	Directly consistent with H2 governance; does not rule out undisclosed control failures.
ACH-0022	AIM strategy explicitly seeks machine augmentation across collection, analysis and decision workflows	1	2	2	1	3	Modern machine mediation is predicted by H1/H2 and only weakly diagnostic for H3.
ACH-0023	Federal AI inventories are incomplete or inaccurate	1	1	2	1	1	Administrative incompleteness is broadly compatible with all hypotheses and has low diagnosticity.
ACH-0024	Strategic Computing plans acknowledged major gaps between desired autonomous capabilities and contemporary resources	2	1	1	-2	5	Technical gap is a strong constraint on decades-early frontier-equivalent H3 claims absent evidence of hidden enabling infrastructure.

ID	Observation	H0	H1	H2	H3	Weight	Rationale
ACH-0025	IARPA has no operational mission/direct field deployment	2	1	2	0	3	Prevents research-program existence from serving as deployment evidence.
ACH-0026	Modern IC governance documents preserve human accountability and stop authority	2	1	2	0	3	Supports H2 institutional design; policy alone cannot prove field compliance.

Appendix E. Historical Compute and Infrastructure Benchmarks

System	Year	Organization	Compute	Memory / storage	Power / cooling	Source	Research relevance
CDC 6600	1964	Control Data Corporation	~3 MFLOPS	/		SRC-0031	Public supercomputing baseline.
Cray-2	1985	Cray	>1 GFLOP	/		SRC-0031	Public supercomputing baseline.
CM-5 at Los Alamos	1993	Los Alamos National Laboratory	59.7 GFLOP/s Linpack	/		SRC-0032	Public benchmark anchor.
ASCI Red	1996	Sandia / DOE	>1 TFLOP	/		SRC-0031	Public teraflop milestone.
ASCI White	2000	LLNL	4.9 TFLOP/s Linpack	6 TB / 160 TB	~3 MW compute + ~3 MW cooling	SRC-0033	Physical footprint benchmark.
Roadrunner	2008	Los Alamos / DOE	>1 PFLOP	/		SRC-0031	Public petaflop milestone.
Titan	2012	ORNL	17.59 PFLOPS achieved	/		SRC-0034	Public accelerator-era benchmark.
Summit	2018	ORNL	200 PFLOPS peak	/		SRC-0034	Public modern HPC benchmark.

Benchmark caution: historical FLOPS constrain physical scale but are not a direct measure of AI capability. Model architecture, precision, memory bandwidth, data, interconnect, software, and workload efficiency can dominate practical performance.

Appendix F. Legal and Oversight Authorities

ID	Authority	Type / date	Scope	Oversight	Source	Qualification
AUTH-0001	ICD 203 — Analytic Standards	IC Directive • 2022-12-21	Analytic rigor, source quality, uncertainty, alternatives	ODNI governance/evaluation	SRC-0018	Methodological baseline for this investigation.
AUTH-0002	ICD 906 — Controlled Access Programs	IC Directive •	Management/ oversight of IC Controlled Access Programs	Formal approval, access, governance structures	SRC-0019	Secrecy treated as bounded institutional condition.
AUTH-0003	10 U.S.C. §119 — Special access programs: congressional oversight	Statute • Current	SAP notification/reporting/oversight structure	Defense committees / statutory mechanisms	SRC-0020	Use historical version for period-specific claims.
AUTH-0004	Section 215 / USA PATRIOT Act telephone records authority	Statutory/ operational authority • 2001-2015	Telephone records / counterterrorism authority	FISC, Congress, PCLOB; later replaced by USA FREEDOM Act framework	SRC-0035	Legal context for bulk metadata case.
AUTH-0005	FISA Section 702	Statutory surveillance authority • 2008-present	Target non-U.S. persons abroad for foreign intelligence under procedures	FISC, Congress, PCLOB, agency procedures	SRC-0036	Foreign-targeting / U.S.-person nexus must remain distinct.
AUTH-0007	10 U.S.C. § 119 — Special Access Programs	statute • 2026-09-10	Reporting and oversight mechanisms for special access programs	Congressional defense committee reporting/notification	SRC-0054	Use current official code; oversight does not reveal contents or guarantee compliance.
AUTH-0008	Intelligence Community AI Ethics Framework 1.0	policy framework • 2020-06	AI purpose, human accountability, review, records, stop/modify authority	Agency/IC governance and oversight	SRC-0046	Policy expectations; implementation must be separately audited.
AUTH-0009	Common IC Interim Guidance on Foundation AI Models	interim policy guidance • 2025	Acquisition/use of foundation models; legal, security and privacy constraints	IC governance / agency implementation	SRC-0050	Modern guidance only.

Appendix G. Priority Record-Acquisition Queue

ID	Agency	Records requested	Date range	Priority	RQ	Status	Notes
FOIA-0001	CIA	Project ASPIN final report, attachments, implementation memoranda, and follow-on system records.	1968-1978	Critical	RQ-0001	Draft	
FOIA-0002	CIA / ODNI	AISG charter, membership, minutes, budgets, project portfolio, and successor records.	1982-1992	Critical	RQ-0002	Draft	
FOIA-0004	DARPA / DTIC	Strategic Computing final reports and transition records for ALV, Pilot's Associate, and battle management.	1983-1995	Critical	RQ-0003	Draft	
FOIA-0008	DoD OIG / Service IGs	IG/audit records on unauthorized autonomous actions, override failures, or consequential unexplained outputs.	1990-2026	Critical	RQ-0006	Draft	
FOIA-0009	CIA	CIA AI Working Group/AISG charters, minutes, application inventories, budgets, training, and successor records.	1982-1990	Critical	RQ-0018	Draft	
FOIA-0010	DIA	DIA AI Working Group/AISG participation, prototypes, budgets, evaluations, and transitions.	1982-1990	Critical	RQ-0018	Draft	
FOIA-0011	NSA	NSA AI Working Group/AISG participation, projects, evaluations, and transition-to-mission records.	1982-1990	Critical	RQ-0018	Draft	
FOIA-0014	ODNI	IC foundation-model inventories, risk assessments, tool/memory/action authority, and human-approval controls.	2023-2026	Critical	RQ-0024	Draft	
FOIA-0003	CIA	CIA analyst-workstation AI program records, evaluations, architecture, and transition documents.	1984-1995	High	RQ-0004	Draft	
FOIA-0005	DARPA / U.S. Army	PAL/CALO-to-CPOF transition records, authority boundaries, and evaluation reports.	2002-2012	High	RQ-0004	Draft	
FOIA-0006	ODNI / IARPA	OSI and Mercury evaluation reports, performer lists, datasets, technical reports, and transition records.	2010-2020	High	RQ-0009	Draft	
FOIA-0007	NSA	Historical NSA AI/NLP program descriptions, transition-to-mission records, and governance materials.	2008-2021	High	RQ-0004	Draft	
FOIA-0012	CIA	SAFE and AEGIS/RECON design, database/interface, hardware, evaluation, and successor-lineage records.	1968-1990	High	RQ-0017	Draft	
FOIA-0013	ODNI / ICIG	IC AI Ethics Framework implementation, audits, risk assessments, exceptions, incidents, and stop/modify controls.	2020-2026	High	RQ-0023	Draft	

Appendix H. Open Evidence Gaps

Gap	Claim	Missing link	Description	Priority	Best evidence	Research path	RQ
GAP-0001	CLM-0003	autonomy	Project ASPIN capability is established only at title/ADP-support level; autonomy and architecture unknown.	Critical	Full report, implementation docs, system architecture	CIA Reading Room / FOIA	RQ-0001
GAP-0002	CLM-0004	program portfolio	AI Steering Group existence established; projects, budgets and outputs unknown.	Critical	TOR, minutes, project lists, budgets	CIA/ODNI archives / FOIA	RQ-0002
GAP-0003	CLM-0005	achievement vs plan	Strategic Computing plan is not evidence that proposed systems achieved stated capabilities.	Critical	Final reports, evaluations, transition docs	DTIC/DARPA archives	RQ-0003
GAP-0005	CLM-0008	domestic scope	OSI public scope supports societal forecasting but not domestic operational deployment.	Critical	Evaluation geography, data sources, sponsor use/transition records	IARPA archives	RQ-0009
GAP-0006	CLM-0012	mission specificity	NSA public article confirms mission integration but not program names, authority or domestic/foreign scope.	Critical	Program docs, governance, oversight, transition records	NSA FOIA/declassified holdings	RQ-0009
GAP-0008	CLM-0025	H3 distinctive evidence	No public corpus evidence of persistent machine-selected goals or autonomous domestic strategic intervention.	Critical	Authenticated logs, architecture, operator testimony, incident records	Cross-agency archival/IG/FOIA	RQ-0015
GAP-0009	CLM-0026	resource causation	Infrastructure growth is established but machine-originated causal action is not.	Critical	Logs/ recommendations/ procurement actions initiated by system	Modern incident records / historical audit trails	RQ-0008
GAP-0011	CLM-0032	portfolio maturity	1984 memo identifies candidate applications but does not establish which were prototyped, funded, deployed, or evaluated.	Critical	AISG minutes, application reports, budgets, transition records	CIA/DIA/NSA/ODNI archives	RQ-0018
GAP-0015	CLM-0043	persistent state evidence	No authenticated historical evidence has yet been identified showing machine goal/model state persisted across program or sponsor transitions.	Critical	source code/state archives, architecture diagrams, logs, operator records	multi-agency archives/contractor records	RQ-0021
GAP-0016	CLM-0043	control-conflict evidence	No authenticated historical evidence has yet been identified showing strategic concealment, shutdown resistance, or unauthorized self-preserving action by a U.S. government AI system.	Critical	incident logs, test reports, IG investigations	DoD/IC IG and safety archives	RQ-0022
GAP-0017	CLM-0037	modern agent authority	Public IC foundation-model guidance does not enumerate tool access, persistent memory, or automated external-action authority for individual classified systems.	Critical	system inventories/risk assessments/authority diagrams	ODNI/agency records	RQ-0024
GAP-0004	CLM-0007	authorization architecture	PAL/CPOF transition established; exact	High	Operational manuals, evaluation	DARPA/Army archives	RQ-0005

Gap	Claim	Missing link	Description	Priority	Best evidence	Research path	RQ
			automation/override boundaries need reconstruction.		reports, workflow authority diagrams		
GAP-0007	CLM-0017	classified compute bounds	Public milestones do not quantify plausible classified advantage.	High	Historical procurements, classified/declassified HPC facility records	DOE/DoD/IC archives	RQ-0013
GAP-0010	CLM-0031	architecture continuity	AEGIS/RECON-to-SAFE continuity is institutionally supported, but exact code/data/model continuity is not reconstructed.	High	design docs/system diagrams/contract records	CIA/NARA/contractor archives	RQ-0017
GAP-0012	CLM-0033	symposium-to-program transition	Symposium session titles establish an application ecosystem but not project maturity or deployment.	High	project final reports, contracts, performer records	CIA/DARPA/DTIC archives	RQ-0019
GAP-0013	CLM-0044	quantitative feasibility verification	Exact Strategic Computing compute-gap figures and achieved performance require page-level primary-source extraction and program-specific comparison.	High	primary plan pages and final program evaluations	NTIS/DTIC/DARPA archives	RQ-0020
GAP-0014	CLM-0048	governance implementation	Published IC ethics/guidance establishes policy expectations, not classified-system compliance.	High	implementation audits, risk assessments, incident findings	ODNI/ICIG records	RQ-0023

Appendix I. Pre-Registered Tests

The tests below were locked in Version 5 before the next evidence-acquisition cycle. They are designed to prevent later discoveries from shifting the standard of proof. A test can raise or lower confidence without mechanically deciding the hypothesis.

ID	Test	Evidence classes required	Core kill condition
TST-0001	Persistent objective test	Documentary + behavioral/operational	No authenticated machine-maintained strategic objective after exhaustive review of a claimed program lineage.
TST-0002	Autonomous consequential action test	Behavioral/operational + documentary	Claimed case lacks an action path beyond recommendation or human approval.
TST-0003	Closed-loop adaptation test	Behavioral/operational + technical	No cross-cycle strategic feedback loop in claimed system.
TST-0004	Control divergence test	Behavioral/operational + documentary	No authenticated divergence after targeted anomaly search.
TST-0005	State-continuity test	Technical + documentary	No machine-state bridge between programs central to the historical theory.
TST-0006	Resource self-expansion test	Infrastructure + behavioral/operational + documentary	No machine-originated causal link from action to resource expansion.
TST-0007	Distributed governance test	Documentary + empirical behavioral	None; H1 can coexist with H2/H3 in parts of the system.
TST-0008	Classified human-directed automation test	Documentary + legal/oversight	None; H2 is rejected for a specific case only if human-direction model fails.

Appendix J. Bounded Likelihood-Ratio Sensitivity Model

The table records subjective low/base/high likelihood ratios used only for sensitivity analysis. Values are not empirical frequencies and should never be quoted as measured probabilities. Independence groups are recorded so derivative or correlated observations are not multiplied blindly.

ID	Observation	Comparison	LR low	LR base	LR high
BAY-0001	Historically secret intelligence programs affected Americans.	H3 vs H2	0.7	1.0	1.5
BAY-0002	The Intelligence Community created an AI Steering Group in 1983.	H3 vs H2	0.5	0.8	1.2
BAY-0003	SAFE/COINS were large classified/networked information systems with institutional importance.	H3 vs H2	0.4	0.7	1.0
BAY-0004	SAFE suffered major design errors, management problems, cost growth, and delay.	H3 vs H2	0.2	0.5	0.9
BAY-0005	Government programs pursued automated societal forecasting and narrative/soci	H3 vs H2	0.5	0.9	1.4

	al-media analysis.				
BAY-0006	No authenticated public record in the corpus shows persistent machine-selected strategic objectives.	H3 vs H2	0.1	0.3	0.7
BAY-0007	No authenticated public record in the corpus shows autonomous domestic strategic intervention by a persistent machine actor.	H3 vs H2	0.1	0.3	0.8
BAY-0008	Current strategic/tactical AI programs explicitly retain commander/human judgment.	H3 vs H2	0.3	0.6	1.0
BAY-0009	Parallel UK and Soviet state computing/AI initiatives existed during the same period.	H3 vs H0/H2	0.4	0.8	1.1
BAY-0010	Current data-center resource	H3 vs H0/H1/H2	0.2	0.5	1.0

	expansion has strong commercial, cloud, scientific, and national-security explanations.				

Appendix K. Source Independence and Evidence-Class Protocol

Evidence is classified as documentary, infrastructure, behavioral/operational, or legal/oversight. Source dependencies are stored separately. A strong H3 finding requires content-relevant convergence across independent classes; multiple derivative documents do not satisfy the rule. The database currently contains explicit dependency links for later syntheses that rely on shared Strategic Computing histories and for later GAO reports that draw on common federal AI inventory processes.

Appendix L. Negative Controls and Foreign Comparators

Control	**Analogous signatures**	**Implication**
SAFE: ambitious classified intelligence information system	classification; interagency scope; analyst dependence; long development; large cost; technical complexity	Demonstrates that secrecy + complexity + institutional centrality are not diagnostic of H3.
COINS: interagency online intelligence retrieval	classified network; cross-agency access; security concerns; machine-mediated analyst workflow	Demonstrates that early networked intelligence infrastructure can look systemically powerful without agency.
DARPA Distributed Battle Management	adaptive planning; real-time military context; automated decision aids	High automation and adaptation do not imply strategic sovereignty.
DARPA DISCORD	AI-native tactics generation; live sensor data; adaptive strategies	Even strategic recommendation generation is compatible with human command.
DIA MARS	large-scale intelligence synthesis; machine assistance; operational importance	Modern machine-assisted intelligence can be consequential without H3.
Country / case	**Capability or ambition**	**H3 implication**
United Kingdom — Alvey Programme	Large government-industry advanced IT/AI R&D program	Parallel investment supports geopolitical/industrial

	with more than 300 subprojects and defense participation.	convergence as an alternative to U.S.-specific hidden-agent explanations.
Japan — Fifth Generation Computer Systems project	National effort aimed at next-generation computing, knowledge processing, and AI-related capabilities.	Shows autonomous-seeming ambitions can arise from state industrial competition without evidence of machine agency.
Soviet Union — Computerized correlation-of-forces / strategic warning modeling	Reported computer modeling of military, economic, and psychological indicators for strategic warning/correlation of forces.	Supports ordinary military-bureaucratic demand for computerized strategic modeling; does not establish autonomous objective selection.

Appendix M. Reproducibility and Update Protocol

The research system is versioned. Material new evidence should trigger: (1) source registration and provenance check; (2) claim linkage; (3) evidence-class assignment; (4) source-dependency review; (5) ACH update; (6) bounded-likelihood update where applicable; (7) confidence-update entry; and (8) manuscript-map review. Claims are not rewritten directly in the manuscript before the database is updated.

For external replication, the release package includes the canonical SQLite database, the relational schema, the master workbook, a machine-readable methodology protocol, the red-team report, and file hashes. The database—not the prose document—is the authoritative register of claim IDs, evidence links, unresolved gaps, and current hypothesis status.

Source Notes

Numbered citations throughout the manuscript map to the registered sources below. Each entry includes the stable Research OS source ID so claims can be audited against the companion database.

1. CIA / U.S. Intelligence Board. “COINS Management Structure.” Central Intelligence Agency. 1968-02-05. CIA-RDP82M00097R001400070003-7. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp82m00097r001400070003-7 [Research OS: SRC-0040]

2. CIA. “Status of Final Report of Project ASPIN (Automated Systems for the Production of Intelligence, dated July 1970).” 1971-04-23. CIA-RDP78-04723A000300020001-4. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04723a000300020001-4 [Research OS: SRC-0003]

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